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Summary
This dissertation contains two parts. In part I we consider a portfolio choice problem
faced by an open-end fund manager who needs to deal with periodic money flows. We
investigate the optimal portfolio and its implications on the costs of portfolio delegation
and on the liquidity premia. We show that the money flows create implicit incentives
for the fund manager and significantly increase the trading volume of the illiquid asset,
which implies surprisingly high liquidity premia. We also show that the transaction costs
could help to reduce the costs of portfolio delegation for conservative investor. In part II
we propose interest rate models with random level shifts to capture the salient empirical
features observed in the U.S. short-term treasury market. We fit affine yield models with
one factor or two factors to the U.S. treasury bill yield data from 2002 to 2009 and test
these fitted models in the out-of-sample period that extends from 2010 to 2011. We
show that the affine yield models with random level shifts almost uniformly outperform
their counterparts without random level shifts. In particular, we show that both the
time series forecast power and the cross-sectional pricing power are almost uniformly
improved by incorporating the random level shifts.
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Through more than a century’s development, quantitative finance has now become one of
the most important and fruitful branches of financial studies. Good quantitative models
usually help to reveal profound connections between theory and data, and to improve
our understandings of various financial phenomenons and activities in the real world.
This thesis aims at studying two problems in finance via quantitative approach, and
it consists of two relatively independent parts. In part I we consider a portfolio choice
problem faced by an open-end fund manager who needs to deal with periodic money
flows. We investigate the optimal portfolio and its implications on the costs of portfolio
delegation and on the liquidity premia. In part II we propose interest rate models with
random level shifts to capture the salient empirical features observed in the U.S. short-
term treasury market. The detailed introduction of each part is presented below.
1.1 Implicit Incentives of Mutual Fund Managers and the
Value of Stock Liquidity
One of the dominant characteristics of developed financial markets is the significant
share of financial wealth that is delegated to professional portfolio managers instead of
being managed directly by its owners. According to the Investment Company Institute
1
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FactBook, in the U.S., at year-end 2011, $11.6 trillion were in the hands of open-end
mutual funds, from more than 92 million U.S. investors, accounting for 49% of the $23.8
trillion in mutual fund assets worldwide. About 45% of the U.S. assets under management
was invested in equity funds. In addition, at year-end 2011, open-end funds held 25%
of outstanding shares of U.S.-issued stocks, and 23% of households’ total financial assets
were in the hands of investment firms.
Given the size of this industry, mutual funds as a group can be the marginal investor
in a stock, and their actions can constitute the main driver of the price of this stock.
It is therefore important to study how the different incentives that govern the mutual
fund industry affect asset pricing. In particular, in this study we mainly focus on how
the daily liquidity offered by open-end funds to the investing public can induce more
frequent trading and amplify the magnitude of the effect of transaction costs on the
liquidity premia of the assets traded by these fund managers.
Investors can typically move money in and out of open-end mutual funds by pur-
chasing or redeeming their holdings in the fund. Unlike their closed-end and hedge-fund
counterparts, open-end fund managers must then deal with these periodic money flows
into and out of their funds, and these flows can be tricky to handle. In particular, flows
can negatively affect fund managers’ market timing ability. They often see significant
redemptions in periods when their funds have fared poorly, forcing them to sell into
markets where the fund’s securities have been declining in value. Inflows, on the other
hand, often occur after years of good performance, presumably when market valuations
are less attractive. Moreover, many imperfections are prevalent in financial markets, like
the presence of transaction costs and short-selling restrictions.
One purpose of this study is then to investigate, in a dynamic portfolio choice frame-
work, how periodic flows affect the optimal investment policy of mutual funds in the
presence of transaction costs and position limits. We examine how periodic flows can
distort portfolio allocations and incentives of a mutual fund manager, as well as the mag-
nitude of the impact that transaction costs can have on the pricing of the financial assets
traded by this fund manager. In particular, transaction costs can affect the liquidity
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premia of assets. Following [18], we define the liquidity premium as the expected return
an investor is willing to exchange for zero transaction cost.
We attempt to capture some of the salient features of the mutual fund industry in
our analysis. We assume an exogenously given positive and convex relation between the
past performance of a fund and its investors’ flows, as documented in [14], [17], and [59].
In other words, we assume that investors’ flows tend to reward good past performance
disproportionately more than they penalize poor past performance. We assume the per-
formance of a mutual fund to be measured relative to the performance of a perfectly
liquid benchmark index, e.g. the S&P 500,1 and that money flows occur periodically at
a lower frequency than that of portfolio revisions. We assume that the fund manager
receives a fixed proportion of the assets under management as her compensation.2 The
objective of the fund manager is thus to maximize the amount of assets under man-
agement (AUM) that she is able to accumulate by the end of her horizon. Our mutual
fund dynamically allocates capital between a money market account, a perfectly liquid
benchmark index and a single alternative composite asset. Trading on this alternative
asset incurs transaction costs, while trading on other assets is costless. The alternative
asset typically offers a higher expected return than the benchmark index, but has also a
higher return volatility.
It has been shown in e.g. [14] and [17] that, the convex sensitivity of fund flows
to relative past performance induces the fund manager to gamble, in order to increase
the likelihood of finishing ahead of the benchmark and enjoying future inflows. In this
study, we use a familiar portfolio choice model with transaction costs to show that, such
implicit incentives created by fund flows can have important asset pricing implications.
In particular, we find that, transactions costs can have a first-order effect on the liquidity
1 [56] documents that, for the period between 1994 and 2004, the S&P 500 was the benchmark used
by the largest number of funds (44.4% of the 1,815 actively managed, diversified U.S. equity mutual
funds analyzed).
2 A fraction of funds fee is the predominant fee structure in the mutual fund industry. According to
[38], as of 1997, approximately 98% of all mutual funds were using a fraction of fund fees without any
performance based incentives.
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premium of an asset when open-end funds are the marginal investor in that asset.
We follow the setup proposed in [8], except that we assume a number of alternative
(perhaps more realistic) features. Specifically, the fund manager can trade on the money
flows experienced by the fund, and fund flows can happen a number of times during
the finite investment horizon. In addition, the fund’s portfolio needs to comply with
certain positions limits. In fact, the Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts mutual
funds ability to short sell and purchase securities on margin, and mutual funds tend to
voluntarily refrain from engaging in these activities ([3]).
A long body of research has been conducted on the optimal portfolio choice in the
presence of transaction costs, starting with the seminal work of [18]. The presence
of transaction costs significantly changes the optimal portfolio choice of investors. In
particular, under transaction costs, continuous and unlimited trading (as in [51, 52]) is
no longer possible, and even a very small transaction charge can dramatically reduce
the frequency of trading of an investor. However, most studies on transaction costs (e.g.
[18], [27], and [45]) find that the liquidity premium is surprisingly small relative to the
transaction cost rate itself, and conclude that transaction costs only have a second-order
effect for asset pricing. For example, [18] finds that the liquidity premium to transaction
cost (LPTC) ratio is only about 0.07 for a proportional transaction cost of 1%. However,
this conclusion is not in line with many empirical findings that suggest that transaction
costs significantly influence the time-series and the cross-section of stock returns.3 For
example, [4] find that the LPTC ratio is about 1.90 for NYSE stocks. [12] and [54] find
that the difference in expected returns across portfolios sorted on liquidity measures is
in the order of 6% to 7% per annum, while [42] quantify the transaction costs associated
with trading individual stocks and find a 3% cost for the five smallest size deciles and a
1% cost for the five largest.
In order to bridge the gap between the empirical evidence and the existing theo-
retical results, some recent papers by [40], [22], and [50], provide better results on the
magnitude of the effect of transaction costs on liquidity premia. In particular, [40] show
3 See, for example, [4], [12], [10], and [54].
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that transaction costs can have a significantly larger effect on liquidity premia when it
is assumed that the return dynamics of the risky illiquid asset varies across bull and
bear regimes, which induces the need to trade more frequently. However, the LPTC
found in [40], for reasonable calibration, is still only about 0.25, which is short relative to
what is suggested by empirical evidence. In [22] it is shown that, if one incorporates the
well-established fact that market volatility during trading periods is significantly larger
than the one during non-trading periods, then transaction costs have a first-order effect
on liquidity premia, which is comparable to that suggested by the empirical evidence.
For instance, they find that, when volatility during trading periods is three times that of
non-trading periods, the LPTC ratio is about 1.76, for a proportional transaction cost
of 1%. However, they recognize that such result is mainly due to the substantially sub-
optimal risk exposure chosen to control transaction costs, and not due to more frequent
trading. Actually, investors in the model of [22] trade even less frequently than in the
model of [18]. More recently, [50] show that incorporating return predictability, labor in-
come, and state-dependent transaction costs, can significantly improve the magnitude of
the effect of transaction costs on liquidity premia. However, after reasonable calibration,
their result is still significantly smaller than what is documented in empirical evidence
(e.g. [12] and [54]).
Without assuming market closure or time-variation in an investor’s investment op-
portunity set, we show that the presence of flows induces the fund manager to trade
the illiquid asset more frequently.4 We show that the additional trading of the fund
manager, induced by her implicit incentives to increase the likelihood of future inflows,
is (almost exclusively) endogenous. This means that, in our model, the frequency and
volume of trading are determined by the fund manager’s optimal trading policy, not by
the exogenous fund flows which are tradable.
As a result, we find that the heavy transaction cost bill induced by the fund manag-
er’s implicit incentives, can make transaction costs have a first-order effect on liquidity
4 According to the Investment Company Institute, FactBook 2011, the asset-weighted average port-
folio turnover rate of equity mutual funds for the period between 1974 and 2010, was 58%.
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premia, assuming that the fund manager is the marginal investor on the asset subjected
to transaction costs. For instance, we show in the numerical analysis that if the fund
manager has a risk aversion of 2.5, a horizon of one calendar year, and money flows
happen on an annual basis (like in [8]), we are able to generate a liquidity premium of
3.52% for a proportional (round-trip) transaction cost rate of 1% (which translates into
an LPTC ratio of 3.52).5 Like in [8], when flows happen on an annual basis, and the
investment horizon is one year, those flows happen at the terminal date and are non-
tradable. We show that our results do not depend on the assumption of such a short
investment horizon. In fact, using the same baseline parameter values as before, but
excluding the influence of fund flows, the model generates a liquidity premium as small
as 0.20%, which is negligible like in [18].
Generally, transaction costs decrease an investor’s utility through either the wealth
that is consumed by the transaction cost bill, or the suboptimal risk exposure imposed
by the presence of transaction costs. The results in [22] are shown to be due mostly to
the suboptimal risk exposure chosen by the investor to control transaction costs, while
in [40], and [50], the results are driven mostly by the increase in the frequency of trading
induced by the time-variation in the investment opportunity set. In our model, the main
source of liquidity premia is the need to trade more frequently in order to respond to the
implicit incentives of the manager created by the presence of fund flows.
5 Our baseline model assumes the following parameter values. We use a calibration of the fund flow
function according to the empirical estimations of [17]. Specifically, when the performance of the fund
is lagging that of the benchmark by 8% or more, the fund experiences redemption requests of 20% of
assets under management. If instead the fund is doing better than the benchmark by 8% or more, the
fund experiences an inflow of 50% of the value of assets under management. Between -8% and +8%, the
flow function exhibits a linear upward-sloping section. We use 11% and 18% as the constant expected
returns of the liquid benchmark and the alternative asset, respectively. We use 20% and 37% as the
constant volatilities of the benchmark and the alternative asset, respectively. These parameter values
roughly match the average annual return and volatility, over the period 1927-2009, of the high and low
quintiles of the size-sorted (value-weighted) Fama-French portfolios. We use an investment horizon of 1
year. Unless otherwise stated, our baseline model results are derived using a coefficient of relative risk
aversion for the fund manager of 4.
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Given the popularity of delegated portfolio management, another purpose of this
study is to investigate how transaction costs affect the portfolio delegation decision.
Transaction costs could either amplify or reduce the discrepancy between the manager’s
optimal portfolio and the investor’s desirable portfolio. In addition, transaction costs
bill directly consumes the investor’s wealth. Therefore, the welfare effect of transaction
costs could be subtle and intricate.
We show that, generally, when the investor is aggressive (with small risk aversion
parameter), the presence of transaction costs is likely to increase the costs of portfolio
delegation, and that when the investor is more conservative, the presence of transaction
costs can reduce the costs of portfolio delegation. In the later case, the costs of portfolio
displacement is reduced by the transaction costs, and this benefit exceeds those costs
due to transaction costs bill itself.
This study is related to the empirical literature on the pricing implications of insti-
tutional flows. Examples of such work are [19], [34], and [48].
1.2 Random Level Shifts in U.S. Short-Term Yields
In the United States, short-term Treasuries are frequently used by the Federal Reserve
to implement monetary policies. By buying or selling the short-term Treasuries, the Fed
regulates the money supply in the market and achieves certain economic target. Conse-
quently, short-term Treasury yields often exhibit salient level shifting feature, especially
during the recent years when the economy is more volatile.
Figure 1.1 depicts several selected U.S. Treasury yields with different maturities, with
data extending from 2002 to 2013. The one month yield kept increasing with the housing
bubble and reached its peak in the summer of 2006. Later, in response to the burst
of housing bubble and the following global financial crisis, “the Federal Reserve took
extraordinary actions in order to help stabilize the U.S. economy and financial system.
These actions included reducing the level of short-term interest rates to near zero.”6
6A quotation from http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money 12849.htm.
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Figure 1.1: The U.S. Treasury Yields
This figure depicts the U.S. Treasury yields from January 2002 to December 2013. One month,
six month, one year, five year and twenty year yields are included for illustration.
As direct consequence, the short-term yields dropped to historically low level since the
beginning of 2009. The average one month yield from January 2009 to December 2013
was 0.075%, as opposed to being at 2.48% from January 2002 to December 2008, and the
standard deviation of the one month yield from 2009 to 2013 is 0.055%, as opposed to
being at 1.55% from 2002 to 2009. Three months, six months and twelve months yields
exhibit similar behavior. These short-term yields have stayed at the extremely low level
for more than four years without reversion, and exhibit prominent de-correlation with
the long-term yields.
Similar phenomenon is observed in the repo market. Figure 1.2 depicts three major
U.S. repo index data from January 2005 to November 2012.7 It shows that repo rates also
exhibit level shifting pattern which is almost identical to that the T-bill yields exhibit.
These empirical facts naturally motivate a question: is it possible to incorporate these
level shifts and improve the performance of interest rate models at the short-end of the
yield curve? To answer this question, we propose novel interest rate models to capture
these level shifts in the short-term rates. Our model builds on the family of short rate
models that are developed by [60], [29], [20], [35], [39], [9] and [31], among others.
7Data source: http://www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index.aspx
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MBS GCF Repo Weighted Average Rate
Treasury GCF Repo Weighted Average Rate
Agency GCF Repo Weighted Average Rate
Figure 1.2: Three Major U.S. Repo Rate Indexes
This figure depicts three U.S. repo rate indexes from January 2005 to November 2012, including
MBS GCF repo weighted average rate, treasury GCF repo weighted average rate and agency
GCF repo weighted average rate.
Compared to the modeling of the term structure, the modeling of random level shifts
draws academic attention only recently. [49], [55] propose and test a discrete time model
with random level shifts in the U.S. equity market. To the authors’ best knowledge,
continuous time interest rate model with random level shifts has not been explored
in the literature, albeit these level shifts could potentially capture the uncertain level
changes of rates.
We assume the instantaneous spot rate process consists of two independent compo-
nents: r(t) = K(t) + J(t), where K(t) is a diffusive process, and J(t) is a jump process
representing the random level shifts. Under this framework, although closed form solu-
tion is not available, we show that the price of zero coupon bond can be calculated by
efficient numerical procedure. We also show that accurate analytic approximations are
available when the maturity is short.
As illustrative examples, we study the celebrated affine yield models with random level
shifts. We construct a path of J(t) a priori, and then estimate these models efficiently
using a variant of the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method proposed in [2].
[30] show that “completely affine” models proposed in [25] produce poor forecast of the
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yield and propose “essentially affine” models to improve the forecast performance. [16]
further extend the market price of risk to more general forms to improve the in sample
fit. However, we find that these extended market price of risk specifications do not
always guarantee better out-of-sample performance over the “completely affine” market
price of risk, restricted in the T-bill sector and in today’s low interest rate environment.
We show that the inclusion of the random level shifts can almost uniformly improve the
out-of-sample performance, including the time series forecast power and cross-sectional
pricing power8, regardless of the choice of the market price of risk specification.
Our model relates to, but differs from the models with regime switching, e.g., [7],
[26], [44] and others. To make clear difference, we stress that regime switching and level
shifting are conceptually different. In a nutshell, regime switching models usually assume
the factors exhibit different characteristics (e.g., mean and volatility) in different market
regime, while our model with level shifts simply assume that a hidden level changes
over time randomly. The hidden level process in our model can assume a continuum of
positive real values, while the regime switching models usually assume very small number
of different market regimes. Compared to the regime switching models, our model is more
convenient to produce forecast in time series and in cross-section.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows:
Part I is presented through Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. Chapter 2 presents the fund
manager’s problem, describes our modeling assumptions, and provides characterizations
of the solution. Chapter 3 presents the variable reduction and the numerical technique
that is used to solve our model. A numerical analysis of the optimal investment policies,
the magnitude of the effect of transaction costs on liquidity premia, and the costs of
delegated portfolio management, are presented in Chapter 4.
8These two aspects of performance are widely used in the literature to test models out-of-sample, e.g.,
[5].
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Part II is presented through Chapter 5 to Chapter 7. In Chapter 5 we introduce the
general framework of random level shifts and study the bond pricing issues. In Chapter
6 we study the affine yield models with random level shifts, including the issues on model
fitting and forecasting. In Chapter 7 we test the empirical performance of the affine yield
models with random level shifts in the U.S. T-bill market.
The final conclusion is given in Chapter 8. Some proofs and background information
are given in the Appendix.
Part I
Implicit Incentives of Mutual





Now we begin to study the portfolio selection problem with fund flows and transaction
costs. In this chapter we describe the specific assumptions of our model on mutual fund.
The base of our model builds on a series of previous papers, in particular [27] and [8].
2.1 The Model Ingredients and Assumptions
We assume that our mutual fund dynamically allocates capital between a money market
account M which earns constant interest rate, a perfectly liquid risky asset SL and an
alternative composite asset SI which trading is assumed to be subject to transaction
costs. Their time t value M(t), SL(t) and SI(t) are assumed to follow
dM(t) = M(t)rdt,
dSL(t) = SL(t)(αLdt+ σLdWL(t)),
dSI(t) = SI(t)(αIdt+ σIdWI(t)).
where the two Brownian motions have correlation κ ∈ [−1, 1], and the parameters αL,
αI , σL, and σI are assumed to be constants.
The fund manager can buy the illiquid alternative asset at the ask price SAI (t) =
(1 +λ)SI(t) and sell it at the bid price S
B
I (t) = (1−µ)SI(t), where λ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ µ < 1
13
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represent the proportional transaction cost rates for purchases and sales, respectively.
When µ + λ > 0, the above model gives rise to two subwealth equations governing
the evolution of the dollar amount x(t) invested in the perfectly liquid wealth, and the
dollar amount y(t) invested in illiquid wealth, which evolve according to
dx(t) = x(t) [(r + pi(t)(αL − r))dt+ pi(t)σLdWL(t)]− (1 + λ)dL(t) + (1− µ)dN(t)
dy(t) = y(t)(αIdt+ σIdWI(t)) + dL(t)− dN(t)
where pi(t) is the fraction of liquid wealth that invests in SL, and L(t) and N(t) are
non-decreasing processes which denote the cumulative purchase and sale amounts of SI ,
with L(0−) = N(0−) = 0.
Let z(t) be the value of the benchmark portfolio which consists of β shares of the
liquid risky asset SL and 1 − β shares of the money market account M . As such, the
benchmark evolves according to
dz(t) = z(t) [(r + β(αL − r)) dt+ σLdWL(t)] (2.1)
Departing from the standard literature on portfolio choice under transaction costs,
we assume that our mutual fund is open-ended, experiencing inflows and outflows pe-
riodically. In particular, the fund manager’s investment horizon is partitioned into n
periods, 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tn−1 < tn = T with tk − tk−1 = τ = T/n, where τ is a “time
window” over which one measures the performance of the fund in order to determine the
amount of flow to add to or to withdraw from the fund at each tk, k > 0. Typically τ
can be a year, half a year, or a quarter.
Basically, we extend the model studied in [8], by allowing periodic money flows into
and out of the mutual fund. In their model, fund flows happen only once at the end of
the investment period and are non-tradeable, hence money flows enter the model through
the utility. In our model, intermediate flows are tradeable, hence money flows enter the
model directly through the budget constraint.
The mutual fund manager has to sell some of her holdings to cover redemptions
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due to the restrictions on borrowing or short selling.1 The fund manager uses first her
most liquid wealth to respond to redemption requests and only if the liquid wealth is
insufficient she will have to sell her illiquid assets.2 Similarly, in the event of inflows, the
fund manager builds-up her most liquid holdings, and only after the inflow date she will
reallocate her excess liquidity between liquid and illiquid assets.3 This implies that, at
each flow time tk, we have
x(tk) =
(





x(tk−) + τρ(Rfk −Rbk)[x(tk−) + (1− µ)y(tk−)]
)−
1− µ (2.3)
where ρ() represents the proportional flow rate function, which depends on the fund’s
performance relative to that of the benchmark portfolio.45 The annualized continuously
compounded return of the fund (on a before-flow basis) and of the benchmark, in period













We assume the flow amount to be proportional to the value of wealth after liquidation
costs, x+(1−µ)y.6 Moreover, since we care mainly about the growth rate of the portfolio
over the benchmark over a certain sub-period, we can reset the benchmark value z(t) to
1 Typically, in reality, borrowing is difficult for mutual funds and, because most funds are evaluated
against all-equity benchmarks, few maintain significant cash balances.
2 Note that, in order to meet a one dollar outflow, the fund manager would need to liquidate a nominal
amount of illiquid asset equal to 1/(1− µ).
3 It has been show in e.g. [19] that, in the event of flows, mutual funds trade first on their most liquid
assets before trading on their illiquid ones.
4 This benchmark portfolio can be understood as a market index, or as the average portfolio of the
peer group of our mutual fund.
5We multiply the flow function by τ due to the consideration that ρ() is usually calibrated on annual
basis.
6 We adopt this assumption in order to prevent insolvency of the mutual fund, which would be likely
if we were to compute the amount of flow on the gross amount of wealth.
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be equal to the fund’s portfolio value at every node tk, after the money flows. That is
to say,
z(tk) = x(tk) + y(tk) (2.4)












[x(tk−) + (1− µ)y(tk−)]
)+












[x(tk−) + (1− µ)y(tk−)]
)−
The objective of the fund manager is to maximize the expected utility she derives
from the amount of wealth she accumulates by the end of the investment period, by
choosing a triplet of the investment strategies (pi(t), L(t), N(t)), subject to 0 ≤ pi(t) ≤ 1,
x(t) ≥ 0 and y(t) ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Note that the terminal asset value is given by
A(T ) =
(





x(T−) + τρ(Rf −Rb)(x(T−) + (1− µ)y(T−)))−
1− µ
where Rf and Rb denote the returns of the fund and of the benchmark, respectively, in
the last time-window.
For t ≥ 0, we define the fund manager’s indirect utility function to be
V (t, x, y, z) = max
pi(s),L(s),M(s)
Et [U(A(T ))] (2.5)
subject to 0 ≤ pi(s) ≤ 1, x(s) ≥ 0 and y(s) ≥ 0, for all t ≤ s ≤ T , and U is the manager’s
utility function. Within each interval (tk−1, tk), V (t, x, y, z) is derived from the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) dynamic programming equation,
min {−Vt − LV, Vy − (1− µ)Vx, (1 + λ)Vx − Vy} = 0 (2.6)
where
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Due to the no-borrowing and no-short-selling constraints, equation (2.6) holds on
Ω = {(x, y, z) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0}.7 In addition, the terminal data is given by

























and the connect condition at each time tk is as follows,












[x− + (1− µ)y−]
)+









[x− + (1− µ)y−]
)−
1− µ
and z = x+ y.
On the boundary x = 0, the manager is restricted from buying SI , therefore the
boundary condition is given by
min {−Vt − LV, Vy − (1− µ)Vx} |x=0 = 0 (2.9)
Similarly, on the boundary y = 0, we have
min {−Vt − LV, (1 + λ)Vx − Vy} |y=0 = 0 (2.10)




1− γ , c > 0 (2.11)
7 By imposing such borrowing and short-selling constraints, we set our model further apart from that
studied in [8], in which borrowing and short-selling are permitted.
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where γ > 0 and γ 6= 1 denotes the risk aversion coefficient of the fund manager.
Taking advantage of the homogeneity of this utility representation, we can reduce the
dimensionality of the HJB equation (2.6). We describe this reduction in dimensionality
and the numerical method in Chapter 3.
By a similar argument as in [58], the value function V (t, x, y, z) is the visicosity
solution to equation (2.6) with terminal condition (2.7) and connect condition (2.8). In
addition, for any given time t, the state space {(x, y, z) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0} is split into
three regions:
BR(t) = {(x, y, z) : Vy = (1 + λ)Vx}
SR(t) = {(x, y, z) : Vy = (1− µ)Vx}
NT (t) = {(x, y, z) : (1− µ)Vx < Vy < (1 + λ)Vx}
BR(t), SR(t) and NT (t) represents the buy region, the sell region and no-trading region,
respectively.
2.2 Flow-Performance Function





k −Rbk < θL
ρL + ψ(R
f
k −Rbk − θL) if θL ≤ Rfk −Rbk < θH
ρH ≡ ρL + ψ(θH − θL) if Rfk −Rbk ≥ θH
where ψ > 0, and θL < θH ∈ R. The shape of this function draws on the estimations
by [17]. In our baseline model, when the fund manager’s relative performance reaches
θL, the flow function ρ() exhibits a local convexity until it reaches θH , above which it
returns to flat. It is shown in [8] that such flow function creates an implicit incentive for
the fund manager to increase the tracking error volatility of her asset allocation, with
respect to that of the benchmark, in order to increase the probability of future inflows.
The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, we study the degree to which the
presence of trading costs and of portfolio constraints affect the implicit incentives of a
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fund manager. Second, we study the magnitude of the effect trading costs have on the
liquidity premium required by the fund manager to trade on an illiquid security, given
the incentives created by the flow-performance function. Finally, we study how costly
it is for investors to delegate the administration of their savings to a fund manager,
instead of investing directly, and how market frictions and portfolio constraints affect
such delegation costs. We describe our results in Chapter 4.
Chapter3
Variable Reduction and Numerical
Method
3.1 Variable Reduction
We have formulated the mathematical model in Chapter 2. In this chapter we describe
a variable reduction and illustrate the numerical method to solve the problem.
Since we assume that the amount of money flow is proportional to the wealth under
management, the dynamics of x(t), y(t) and z(t) are linear. As a result, our value function
V (t, x, y, z) has the following property:
Proposition 3.1. The value function V (t, x, y, z) is homogeneous in spacial variable
(x, y, z) with degree 1− γ. That is, for any a > 0, we have
V (t, ax, ay, az) = a1−γV (t, x, y, z) (3.1)
















V (t, x, y, z)
and, using ζ = y/(x+ y), and η = z/(x+ y), we define a new function ϕ as follows
ϕ(t, ζ, η) = V (t, 1− ζ, ζ, η) = 1
(x+ y)1−γ
V (t, x, y, z)
20
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The original HJB equation for V can be transformed into
min {−ϕt −Aϕ,A1ϕ,A2ϕ} = 0 (3.2)
where
A1ϕ = µ(1− γ)ϕ+ (1− µζ)ϕζ − µηϕη
A2ϕ = λ(1− γ)ϕ− (1 + λζ)ϕζ − ληϕη
and the differential operator A is given by




[b0ϕ+ b1ϕζ + b2ϕη + b3ϕζζ + b4ϕηη + b5ϕζη]pi
+ [c0ϕ+ c1ϕζ + c2ϕη + c3ϕζζ + c4ϕηη + c5ϕζη]pi
2
}
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where
a0 = (1− γ)
[





a1 = ζ(1− ζ)(αI − r − γσ2I ζ)
a2 =
[

















a5 = ηζ(1− ζ)(βκσLσI − σ2I ζ)
b0 = (1− γ)(αL − r − κσLσIγζ)(1− ζ)
b1 = −(αL − r)ζ(1− ζ) + κσLσIγζ(1− ζ)(2ζ − 1)
b2 = η(1− ζ)(r − αL − γβσ2L + 2γκσLσIζ)
b3 = −κσLσIζ2(1− ζ)2
b4 = η
2(1− ζ)(κσLσIζ − βσ2L)
b5 = ηζ(1− ζ)
[

























The equation above holds in the region Σ = {(ζ, η) : 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, η ≥ 0}, and the new
terminal condition is given by
ϕ(T, ζ, η) =
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ϕ2(ζ, η) = ζ −
(
1− ζ + τρ (− 1τ lnη) [1− µζ])−
1− µ
Regarding the connect condition, at time tk we have
ϕ(tk−, ζ−, η−) = C(ζ−, η−)1−γϕ(tk, ζ, 1)
where
C(ζ−, η−) = ϕ1(ζ−, η−) + ϕ2(ζ−, η−)
ζ =
ϕ2(ζ−, η−)
ϕ1(ζ−, η−) + ϕ2(ζ−, η−)
The boundary conditions (2.9) and (2.10) are similarly transformed.
3.2 Numerical Procedure
Here, we briefly explain the numerical technique we used to solve the variational in-
equality described above. We apply the standard penalty methods described in [24]. As
pointed out in [24], when applying penalty methods to equation (3.2), numerical oscil-
lation is likely to be generated due to the penalty terms. In order to cure this problem,
we follow [23] and make an additional functional transformation as follows




Then we can obtain the HJB equation for φ(t, ζ, η)1
min {−φt −Mφ,M1φ,M2φ} = 0 (3.3)
1It can be easily seen from the derivation that the function φ has the economic meaning that it is
the equivalent continuous risk free rate associated with the terminal objective function, conditioning on
y/(x+ y) = ζ and z/(x+ y) = η.
3.2 Numerical Procedure 24
for (ζ, η) ∈ Σ, where
Mφ = a0
γ′
+ a1φζ + a2φη + a3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + a4(φηη + γ







+ b1φζ + b2φη + b3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + b4(φηη + γ








+ c1φζ + c2φη + c3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + c4(φηη + γ





M1φ = µ+ (1− µζ)φζ − µηφη
M2φ = λ− (1 + λζ)φζ − ληφη
where γ′ = 1− γ and with terminal condition
φ(T, ζ, η) = ln (ϕ1(ζ, η) + ϕ2(ζ, η)) (3.4)
and connect condition
φ(tk−, ζ−, η−) = φ(tk, ζ, 1) + lnC(ζ−, η−) (3.5)
where ϕ1(ζ, η), ϕ2(ζ, η), and C(ζ, η) are as defined in Appendix A.1.
Instead of directly solving equation (3.3) - (3.5), we consider the following penalty
approximation of (3.3)
φt +Mφ+K(−M1φ)+ +K(−M2φ)+ = 0 (3.6)
where a+ = max{a, 0} and K is a large penalty parameter. In order to deal with
the nonlinear “sup” term, we apply the policy iterative algorithm (cf. [37]), which is
described as follows:
Step 1: Let i = 0, make an initial guess φ0(t, ζ, η) and set an error tolerance  > 0;
Step 2: Find








+ b1φζ + b2φη + b3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + b4(φηη + γ








+ c1φζ + c2φη + c3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + c4(φηη + γ
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Step 3: Solve the equation




+ a1φζ + a2φη + a3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + a4(φηη + γ




+ b1φζ + b2φη + b3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + b4(φηη + γ








+ c1φζ + c2φη + c3(φζζ + γ
′φ2ζ) + c4(φηη + γ







max{1, |φi|} < 
we set φ(t, ζ, η) = φi+1(t, ζ, η). Otherwise, we set i = i+ 1 and go to Step 2.
When solving (3.8) with suitable boundary conditions, we apply the implicit finite-
differences method on an uniform grid. In order to deal with the nonlinear terms, we
apply non-smooth Newton’s iterative method (cf. [33]),
(φi+1ζ )
2 ≈ 2φi+1ζ φiζ − (φiζ)2
(φi+1η )
2 ≈ 2φi+1η φiη − (φiη)2
φi+1ζ φ
i+1
η ≈ φiζφi+1η + φi+1ζ φnη − φiζφiη(−Mjφi+1)+ ≈ (−Mjφi+1) I{−Mjφi>0}, j = 1, 2
Chapter4
Results Analysis
The results we present below are generated using the following set of parameters, unless
otherwise stated.
We fix our fund manager’s investment horizon at one year (T = 1). We assume
semi-annual frequency of fund flows. This means that t0 = 0, t1 = 0.5, t2 = 1.0. We
assume that the values for the expected returns and volatilities of the risky assets roughly
match the average annual return and volatility, over the period 1927-2009, of the high
and low quintiles of the size-sorted (value-weighted) Fama-French portfolios. Therefore,
αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37. We assume that the returns of the liquid
risky asset and of the alternative illiquid asset are uncorrelated, i.e., κ = 0.0. We also
assume that the benchmark only consists of the liquid risky asset, i.e., β = 1.0. The
relative risk aversion coefficient of the fund manager is assumed to be γ = 4.0.
In our baseline model, we calibrate the parameters in the flow function such that
it resembles the function estimated in [17]. Therefore, we use the following parameter
values: ρL = −0.20, ρH = 0.50, θL = −0.08, and θH = +0.08.
We summarize the parameters in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Parameters and Their Baseline Values
This table provides the baseline parameter values which are used in the numerical calculation,
unless otherwise stated. We assume that the values for the expected returns and volatilities of the
risky assets roughly match the average annual return and volatility, over the period 1927-2009,
of the high and low quintiles of the size-sorted (value-weighted) Fama-French portfolios, and we
calibrated the flow-performance function according to the empirical estimations of [17].
Parameter Baseline Value
General enviroment
Yield in the money market r = 2%
Number of flows per year n = 2
Fraction of liquid risky asset in the benchmark portfolio β = 1
Characteristics of the liquid asset
Expected rate of return αL = 11%
Volatility of return σL = 20%
Characteristics of the illiquid asset
Expected rate of return αI = 18%
Volatility of return σI = 37%
Transaction costs rate for purchase λ = 1%
Transaction costs rate for sale µ = 1%
Correlation structure
Correlation between the returns κ = 0.0
Characteristics of the flow function
Maximum reward for outperformance ρH = 0.50
Maximum penalty for underperformance ρL = −0.20
Relative performance threshold for maximum reward θH = 0.08
Relative performance threshold for maximum penalty θL = −0.08
Managerial risk appetite
Managerial relative risk aversion γ = 4.0
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4.1 Optimal Investment Policies
In this section, we describe the results we obtained for the optimal policies of a fund
manager who is subject to borrowing and short-selling restrictions. Investors’ flows
into and out of this manager’s fund respond asymmetrically to the performance of the
fund’s portfolio relative to that of a benchmark portfolio. They reward good relative
past performance with very large inflows, while redemptions as response to poor past
performance are not that severe. This positive and convex response of flows to fund
performance creates implicit incentives for the fund manager to gamble, when under-
performing, in order to increase the likelihood of future inflows. Below we describe the
effects of such incentives in a market without trading costs, and a market with trading
costs.
4.1.1 Optimal Policies Without Transaction Costs
In Figure 4.1, we show the fund manager’s optimal proportion of the benchmark asset
and the alternative asset against its relative performance, that is z/(x+ y). This figure
does not include the effect of transaction costs, like in [8]. Note that, when z/(x+y) > 1,
the fund’s portfolio is doing poorly compared to the benchmark. When that is the case,
and over a finite range (called the risk-shifting range by [8]), the fund manager has
the incentive to tilt her portfolio exposure significantly more towards the alternative
risky asset, and away from the benchmark. In other words, given the convex shape of
the flow-performance relationship, when the manager’s portfolio is under-performing the
benchmark, the manager has an (implicit) incentive to increase the tracking error of her
portfolio with respect to the benchmark, so as to increase the likelihood that, towards
the next flow date, the fund will eventually outperform the benchmark.
In Figure 4.1, we also show how the risk-shifting range changes with the risk aver-
sion of the fund manager. In particular, the range of relative performance over which
the manager is willing to gamble in order to increase the probability of future inflows,
decreases with risk aversion. The degree of portfolio distortion also decreases with risk
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Figure 4.1: Optimal Policy Without Transaction Costs
This figure shows the optimal investment in the alternative asset y/(x + y) as a function of the
fund’s portfolio performance relative to that of the benchmark z/(x + y) at time t = 0. This
figure does not include the effects of transaction costs (λ = µ = 0), and is therefore a replication
of the results in [8], expect that we impose short-selling and borrowing restrictions to our fund
manager. The investment horizon used to produce this figure is T = 1. The other parameters
used in the numerical computations: we use semi-annual flows, which means t0 = 0, t1 = 0.5
and t2 = 1, the dynamics of the assets assume that r = 0.02, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18,
σI = 0.37, κ = 0.0, and β = 1.0.
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aversion. A more risk averse manager is more likely to adopt a passive strategy and
replicate the benchmark more closely.
Note also that the fraction invested in alternative asset exhibits maximum and min-
imum values. The maximum values occur somewhere within the risk-shifting range in
the under-performance region. Not surprisingly, the maximum portfolio allocations to
illiquid asset increase as the risk aversion of the manager decreases. In the extreme case,
when the fund manager has risk aversion of γ = 2.5, she will invest 80% of her portfolio
in the alternative asset at the initial time, and 20% in the benchmark. If we continue to
decrease the manager’s risk aversion, she will fully invest in alternative asset, within cer-
tain relative performance range. This indicates that the manager is taking the maximum
risk (recall that leverage is not allowed in our model). If we were to allow short-selling,
a manager with small risk aversion would short the benchmark to leverage in the alter-
native asset. In [8] such portfolio constraints are not imposed, and the fund manager in
their model is therefore allowed to create more extreme asset allocations. However, in
reality, as we mentioned before, mutual funds’ ability to short sell and purchase securities
on margin is severely restricted by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (see [3]).
Similar to “economies (a)” in [8], the minimum allocations to alternative asset occur
right after the fund performance overcomes that of the benchmark, around the upper
threshold of the flow-performance function, θH . The fund manager mimics the bench-
mark so as to lock in her relative standing. In our model, the mimicking of the benchmark
requires investing everything on the benchmark, and nothing on the alternative asset,
even though the alternative asset offers a positive risk premium and diversification ben-
efits.
Note also that, when the fund’s portfolio is either severely under-performing the
benchmark, or significantly over-performing the benchmark, the manager chooses to hold
a constant fraction invested in the alternative asset. This optimal fraction of alternative
asset for extreme values of relative performance is the same as that we would obtain in
the absence of flows. In other words, when the fund manager’s portfolio is performing
really poorly or really well with respect to the benchmark, she will act like a Mertonian
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Figure 4.2: Dynamics of the Optimal Policy
This figure shows the dynamics of the optimal investment in the alternative asset y/(x + y) as
a function of relative performance z/(x + y). We present three snapshots of the policy at three
different time steps within the investment horizon. In particular, we look at the semi-annual
flow case and take snapshots of the optimal policy at t = 0.10, t = 0.25, and t = 0.40. This
figure does not include the effects of transaction costs (λ = µ = 0), and is therefore a replication
of the results in [8], except that we impose short-selling and borrowing restrictions to our fund
manager. The remaining parameters used in the numerical computations are as follows: T = 1,
r = 0.02, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, κ = 0.0, γ = 4.0, and β = 1.0.
investor ([51], [52]). The risk-shifting incentives created by the flow-performance function
play no role for extreme values of relative performance, just like it was documented and
tested empirically in [8].
In Figure 4.2, we show how the fund manager’s optimal investment policy changes
over time. Note how the risk-taking incentive grow stronger as the time remaining to
the flow date shortens.
In Figure 4.2 we show the representative case in which flows happen on a semi-annual
basis. When we decrease the frequency of flows to annual, or increase the frequency of
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flows to quarterly, we observe the same dynamics for the optimal policy within the year or
each quarter, respectively. Naturally, an increase in the frequency of fund flows amplifies
the fund manager’s overall risk-taking incentives over the investment horizon.
In Figure 4.3, we show how the effective risk aversion of the fund manager changes,
in the under-performance region, for different flow frequencies, and different return cor-
relations, if the manager were to exhibit log-utility preferences. Even though our fund
manager has a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1, the presence of money
flows endogenously induces additional risk appetite with respect to the relative perfor-
mance. Note that the manager’s willingness to accept gambles increases for the values
of relative performance where the gamble’s impact on the total value of assets under
management is larger, which coincides with the risk-shifting range identified in Figures
4.1 and 4.2 above.
Note that the effective risk aversion is sensitive to the correlation of returns between
the risky assets. The largest sensitivity is exhibited in the case of positive correlation.
That is the case in which risk taking (deviation from the benchmark) is harder to achieve
by the fund manager. Therefore, the presence of money flows creates additional high
marginal-utility states. In contrast to the standard Merton model, our fund manager’s
marginal value of her assets under management is high when her portfolio is under-
performing the benchmark portfolio. In this case, she is likely to experience future
redemption requests, which therefore leads to high marginal utility. As we show in Figure
4.3, this induces additional curvature in the value function, and frequent over-investment
in alternative asset relative to the Merton benchmark.
4.1.2 Optimal Policies With Transaction Costs
The introduction of transaction costs creates a no-trading region, which includes the
optimal policy in the absence of transaction cost, on the fund manager’s optimal in-
vestment policy. In Figure 4.4, we plot the buy and sell boundaries that delimit the
manager’s no-trading region. As expected, the shape of this no-trading region depends
on the relative performance of the fund manager’s portfolio with respect to that of the
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Figure 4.3: Effective Risk Aversion
This figure plots the fund manager’s endogenous risk aversion, for γ = 1, for different values of
return correlations between the risky assets, and for different frequencies of flows. These results
are at time t = 0. The effective risk aversion measure the manager’s willingness to pay to avoid
gambles on her illiquid risky asset. The investment horizon used to produce this figure is T = 1.
The other parameters used in the numerical computations: for semi-annual flows t1 = 0.50,
t2 = 1, and for annual flows t1 = 1, r = 0.02, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37,
κ = 0.0, and β = 1.0. In this figure, we assume zero transaction costs, λ = µ = 0.
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Figure 4.4: No-Trading Boundaries and Risk Aversion
This figure shows the no-trading boundaries at initial time (t = 0) for different values of the
risk aversion parameter. The investment horizon used to produce this figure is T = 1. The
other parameters used in the numerical computations: we assume semi-annual flows, i.e., t0 = 0,
t1 = 0.5, t2 = 1, r = 0.02, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, λ = 0.01, µ = 0.01,
κ = 0.0, and β = 1.0.
benchmark portfolio.
The fund manager’s portfolio is likely to be thrown out of balance by capital gains
on its component assets. Like in any other portfolio choice model with proportional
transaction costs (e.g. [27], [46], [45]) in the event that the price of the illiquid risky
asset increase significantly more than that of the liquid benchmark (or, alternatively,
the price of the benchmark falls significantly more than that of the illiquid alternative
security), the portfolio of the fund manager might be pushed to the sell region, the
area above the sell boundary in Figure 4.4. When that happens, the fund manager sells
illiquid asset instantaneously at an infinite speed so as to push her portfolio weight on
illiquid asset back to the sell boundary. The buying case is symmetric.
While the portfolio weight lie between the buy and sell boundaries in Figure 4.4,
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the fund manager is better off not trading the illiquid asset. In fact, in the presence
of proportional transaction costs, trading should only happen when prices changes in
a sufficient large amount so as to compensate for the trading cost involved with the
transaction. As a result, the frequency of trading is significantly reduced when the
transaction costs exist, even when the cost rate is very small.
Note that, the no-trading region in Figure 4.4 is likely to shrink as the risk aversion
of the fund manager increases. It is also likely to be less sensitive to the portfolio relative
performance standing. Therefore, a highly risk averse fund manager (e.g. γ = 5.5) is
likely to trade more frequently due to a narrower no-trading region, but her risk taking
incentives will be much lower. These two effects are likely to (at least partially) offset
each other. In our model, the relative performance concerns are likely to induce a more
risk averse manager to keep her portfolio allocations close to those of the benchmark
portfolio.
Similar offsetting effects appear for a fund manager who is less risk averse (e.g. γ =
2.5). Her no-trading region appears to be wider, which leads to lower frequency in
trading, but this fund manager is however more sensitive to the relative performance
of the portfolio to the benchmark, z/(x + y), which creates substantially more trading
needs. As we will discuss later, the overall amount of trading, and the transaction costs
bill paid by the fund, increase when the fund manager is less risk averse, which means
that the implicit incentives dominate the effect of trading costs in terms of inducing
endogenous trading.
A similar analysis can be done for the case in which we change the asset return
correlations. We present the no-trading boundaries for different return correlations in
Figure 4.5. As return correlation increases, the buy boundary exhibits downward move,
which implies weaker risk taking incentive when underperforming. The sell boundary
also exhibits downward move, though in a less sensitive manner.
Intuitively, if the illiquid asset’s returns are positively correlated with those of the
benchmark, the manager would see less opportunity to shift the risk so as to increase the
probability of outperforming the benchmark. As a result, the manager would have less
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Figure 4.5: No-Trading Boundaries and Return Correlations
This figure shows the no-trading boundaries at initial time (t = 0) for different values of the return
correlation between the illiquid risky asset and the liquid benchmark. The investment horizon
used to produce this figure is T = 1. The other parameters used in the numerical computations:
we assume semi-annual flows, i.e., t0 = 0, t1 = 0.5, t2 = 1, r = 0.02, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20,
αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, λ = 0.01, µ = 0.01, γ = 4.0, and β = 1.0.
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incentive to hold a large position in the illiquid asset. That creates the pattern observed
in Figure 4.5.
A noteworthy feature of the optimal policy is the extremely narrow no-trading region
around the outperforming kink, which indicates that the fund manager trades the illiquid
alternative asset frequently when her portfolio is slightly outperforming the benchmark
portfolio. As a result, we expect that the implicit incentive induced by the convex flows
could have strong impact on the value of liquidity. In the next section, we study the
maximum expected return of the illiquid risky asset that the fund manager is willing to
exchange for zero transaction costs. This concept was first defined in [18] as the liquidity
premium of the asset.
4.2 Liquidity Premia
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis on the impact of periodic fund flows and
transaction costs on the liquidity premia of assets traded by open-end equity funds.
We need to make a distinction between endogenous and exogenous trading due to
fund flows, in the presence of transaction costs.
We start with the more intuitive concept of exogenous trading imposed by fund
flows. Investors can typically move money in and out of an open-end mutual fund, by
purchasing or redeeming their holdings in the fund. In response to investor redemptions,
the manager needs to sell some of its holdings, while in response to new money that flows
into the fund, the manager needs to scale up its existing holdings, or eventually create
new positions. The trades that a fund manager performs as a response to redemptions
or sales of new fund shares to the investors, are considered exogenous trades.
In endogenous trading, however, the frequency and volume of trading are determined
by the fund manager’s optimal investment policy, given her explicit and implicit incen-
tives.
In Table 4.2, we simulate our model in order to distinguish the amount of endogenous
trading from the amount of exogenous trading. The amount of endogenous trading is
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under normal rbl, while the amount of exogenous trading is under flow rbl. Note that
the amount of endogenous trading is significantly larger than the amount of exogenous
trading. This suggests that, most of the trading executed by the fund manager is induced
by the implicit incentive to increase the likelihood of future inflows. Only a small fraction
of the total trading executed by the manager is actually due to the fund flows themselves.1
In the first row of Table 4.2 we present the case in which implicit incentives are absent
from the fund manager’s problem. Note how small the amount of trading is in this case.
The results for this first row confirm the conjecture of [18] that, in those cases in which
the trading of the marginal investor is endogenous, transaction costs have a trivial effect
on the liquidity premium of an asset. In fact, even though we consider as short an
investment period as one year, when implicit incentives are absent (flow freq = 0), the
discounted value of the transaction costs paid during the investment period (PVTC ) is
only 0.03% of the initial amount of wealth. In the case without flows, the fund manager
trades only, on average, 10 times per year, assuming two trades at most per day.
Note that, when we introduce money flows into the fund manager’s problem, the
amount of trading increases and has a positive relationship with the frequency of flows
in the model. We assume that, the last flow of the investment period is non-tradable,
like in [8]. Given that we assume that the investment period is one year, when flow freq
= 1 the dollar amount of exogenous trading (flow rbl), which is due to the flow itself, is
obviously zero.
The fund manager’s exogenous trading starts to reveal itself when we consider the
case in which fund flows happen with semi-annual frequency. In this case, intermediate
flows are tradable. Note that, even when flows are tradable, the amount of exogenous
trading remains small compared to the amount of endogenous trading. The large amount
of endogenous trading then result in expensive trading cost bills for the mutual fund.
1Here we focus on the trading of the illiquid asset. The fund flows, of course, will also induce the
trading of the liquid asset, which is not counted here. Therefore our result does not conflict with the
empirical finding that fund flows typically induce large amount of trading.
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Table 4.2: Optimal Trading Policy, Simulation Results
This table provides the results we obtained from running 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the optimal trading
policies in our model, for a transaction cost rate of 1%. We present results on the following dimensions: the
number of trades executed during the investment period (nr trades); the dollar volume per trade (vol per trade);
the dollar volume of endogenous trading (normal rbl), which is the dollar amount due to intermediate portfolio
rebalancing, excluding the trading forced by fund flows at the flow date; the dollar volume of exogenous trading
(flow rbl), which is the trading due to fund flows on the flow date; the total dollar volume of trading in the
investment period (total vol); the discounted value of the transaction costs paid over the investment period, as a
percentage of the fund’s initial amount of assets under management (PVTC ); and the expected time from buy to
sell, in years (churn int). The numbers reported in parenthesis are the standard deviation of the simulation. We
assume that the manager has an appetite for risk that translates into γ = 4.0, and we show how the frequency of
fund flows affects the simulation results (flow freq = 0 represents the case with no flows, while flow freq = 1 and
2, represent the cases with annual and semi-annual, respectively). We fixed the investment horizon T at 1 year,
and assume at most 2 trades per day. We calibrated the flow-performance function according to the empirical
estimations of [17]. The parameters of Equation (2.2) are as follows: ρH = −0.20, ρL = 0.50, θH = −0.08, and
θL = 0.08. The baseline parameter values we used are as follows: αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37,
κ = 0.0, and β = 1.0.
freq nr trades vol per trade normal rbl flow rbl total vol PVTC churn int
0 9.7118 0.0019 - - 0.0273 0.0003 0.9913
(0.1147) (1.56E-05) - - (3.55E-04) (3.52E-06) (7.53E-04)
1 23.2902 0.0065 0.1594 0.00 0.1594 0.0016 0.7802
(0.1453) (9.43E-05) (0.0025) (0.00) (0.0025) (2.44E-05) (0.0036)
2 31.3247 0.0238 0.6835 0.0289 0.7123 0.0070 0.3282
(0.1293) (1.67E-04) (0.005) (3.15E-04) (0.0049) (4.87E-05) (0.0036)
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In particular, for semi-annual flows, the PVTC is equal to 0.16% of the initial wealth,
using a transaction costs rate of 1%. This is an early indication that the magnitude of
the effect of transaction costs on liquidity premia is large in our model.




ϕ(0, ζ, 1;µ, λ, αI) = ϕ(0, ζ, 1; 0, 0, αI − δ) (4.1)
where the function ϕ(t, ζ, η) is defined in Chapter 3. We present the results on the
liquidity premia in Table 4.3. In Panels A1 and B1, we present the comparative statics
with respect to the fund manager’s risk aversion parameter. Note that, when implicit
incentives are absent (flow freq = 0), the liquidity premia are negligible. If the fund
manager is the marginal investor in this asset, her trading on this asset then commands
a negligible liquidity premium.
Note that, when flow freq = 0, the liquidity premia are generally negligible but they
increase with the fund manager’s risk aversion. However, when flow freq > 0, the liquid-
ity premia can be very large compared to the trading cost rates used, but they typically
decrease with the manager’s risk aversion. This latter result may seem somewhat counter-
intuitive. In fact, existing literature on portfolio selection under transaction costs with
risk averse investors shows that liquidity premia are likely to increase with risk aver-
sion. In our model, however, the fund manager has relative performance concerns. This
means that her optimal portfolio policy includes two components. The first is a passive
component that replicates the benchmark relative to which her portfolio performance is
measured periodically, which then determines whether and the extent to which the fund
experiences inflows or outflows. The second is an active component, which represents
the degree to which she is willing to gamble to finish ahead of the benchmark at the
end of the performance evaluation period. A fund manager with relative performance
concerns is then likely to tilt her portfolio towards the liquid benchmark portfolio as
his risk aversion increases. As a result, an increase in risk aversion is likely to lead the
fund manager to shift more wealth towards the liquid benchmark portfolio and away
from the alternative security. In other words, the more risk averse the fund manager,
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Table 4.3: Liquidity Premia, Comparative Statics
This table provides information on the liquidity premia for different parameter values of the model, given different
transaction cost rates (TC Rate = 1% in Panel A, and TC Rate = 2% in Panel B). The liquidity premia are
computed as the maximum expected return of the illiquid security that the fund manager is willing to exchange
for zero transaction costs. We focus on comparative statics with respect to the risk aversion of the fund manager
(Panels A1 and B1), the correlation of the returns between the risky assets (κ) in Panels A2 and B2, and the
volatility of the illiquid asset (σI) in Panels A3 and B3. We fixed the investment horizon T at 1 year. We calibrated
the flow-performance function according to the empirical estimations of [17]. We assume that, unless otherwise
stated, the manager has an appetite for risk that translates into γ = 4.0. We also show how the frequency of fund
flows affects the liquidity premia results (flow freq = 0 represents the case with no flows, while flow freq = 1 and
2, represent the cases with annual and semi-annual flows, respectively). The baseline parameter values we used
are as follows: αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, κ = 0.0 and β = 1.0.
Panel A: TC Rate = 1% Panel B: TC Rate = 2%
A1: Manager RRA (γ) B1: Manager RRA (γ)
flow freq 2.5 4.0 5.5 flow freq 2.5 4.0 5.5
0 0.20% 0.22% 0.25% 0 0.25% 0.28% 0.31%
1 3.52% 2.66% 1.95% 1 5.72% 3.56% 2.41%
2 8.99% 7.55% 6.79% 2 14.38% 10.69% 8.47%
A2: Correlation (κ) B2: Correlation (κ)
flow freq −0.3 0.0 +0.3 flow freq −0.3 0.0 +0.3
0 0.34% 0.22% 0.17% 0 0.47% 0.28% 0.19%
1 3.36% 2.66% 2.16% 1 4.76% 3.56% 2.54%
2 8.15% 7.55% 7.27% 2 11.71% 10.69% 9.17%
A3: Volatility (σI) B3: Volatility (σI)
flow freq 0.32 0.37 0.42 flow freq 0.32 0.37 0.42
0 0.16% 0.22% 0.30% 0 0.19% 0.28% 0.39%
1 2.51% 2.66% 2.84% 1 3.38% 3.56% 3.77%
2 6.96% 7.55% 8.24% 2 9.69% 10.69% 12.02%
A4: BM Riskiness (β) B4: BM Riskiness (β)
flow freq 0.9 1.0 1.1 flow freq 0.9 1.0 1.1
1 2.60% 2.66% 3.07% 1 3.36% 3.56% 4.20%
2 7.30% 7.55% 8.41% 2 10.41% 10.69% 11.93%
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the more closely she will want to track the benchmark index, and the less attractive is
the alternative security. In contrast, the less risk averse the fund manager, the more she
will want to adopt an active portfolio strategy, and the more she will want to deviate
her portfolio from the benchmark portfolio, in particular when the fund is performing
poorly compared to the passive benchmark index (e.g. [8], and [15]). This means that
the alternative security becomes more attractive to the fund manager when she is less
risk averse, which increases her sensitivity to the transaction costs she needs to incur in
order to rebalance her position in this security. For instance, in Panel A1 of Table 4.3,
we show that, for a transaction costs rate of 1%, and annual flows (non-tradable), the
liquidity premium is 3.52% when the risk aversion parameter of the manager is 2.5. That
corresponds to a liquidity premium to transaction cost (LPTC) ratio of 3.52. If the fund
manager is the marginal investor in this asset, then her trading can command a liquidity
premium of 3.52%. Not surprisingly, liquidity premia increase with the frequency of fund
flows, and that is not because of exogenous trading.
In Panels A2 and B2, of Table 4.3, we show that the liquidity premia decrease with
correlation of asset returns. All else equal, a decrease in correlation between the bench-
mark portfolio and the alternative security generates more trading opportunities. In
the presence of transaction costs, increased trading due to lower correlation of returns
between the risky assets is then likely to lead to larger liquidity premia required on the
part of the fund manager. For instance, when the transaction cost rate is 1%, Panel B1
of Table 4.3 reports that, for annual flows, liquidity premia can vary from 2.16% when
the correlation coefficient between our two risky assets is κ = +0.30, to 3.36% when
κ = −0.30.
In Panels A3 and B3 of Table 4.3, we show that increases in volatility of the alternative
security lead to lower return-to-risk ratios and larger liquidity premia. In general, the
presence of transaction costs prevents the fund manager from taking full advantage of
the variability in stock prices. Therefore, the more volatile is the return of the alternative
asset, the larger the burden associated with holding it in the portfolio, which then pushes
up its required liquidity premium.
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In Panels A4 and B4 of Table 4.3, we show that increases in the riskiness of the bench-
mark portfolio lead to larger liquidity premia. Intuitively, in order to outperform a more
aggressive benchmark, the fund manager needs to trade more actively the alternative
asset, hence leads to larger liquidity premia.
Finally, in Table 4.4, we report how liquidity premia change with changes in the
parameters of the flow function.
Note that, generally, liquidity premia do not exhibit monotonicity with the reward for
outperformance, ρH−ρL. When we increase ρH−ρL from 0.3 to 1.1, the liquidity premia
first increases then decreases. In our model the liquidity premia is driven by two types
of trading: (A) The deviation from the benchmark portfolio when underperforming; (B)
The convergence to the benchmark portfolio when outperforming. When the reward for
outperformance is small, the effect (A) is weak, hence the liquidity premia is reduced.
On the contrary, when the reward for outperformance is large, the effect (B) becomes
weak, since the reward is increased in the whole range of relative performance. As a
result, the liquidity premia is again reduced. In addition, simulations suggest that (B)
is the primary factor that drives the magnitude of liquidity premia. Hence we observe
that in the annual flow case, liquidity premia for large ρH − ρL is even smaller than that
for small ρH − ρL. As for the semi-annual flow case, we observe a decreasing marginal
increase within the considered range, and we believe that similar pattern will appear if
we continue to increase the value of ρH − ρL.
The flow function we use in this study draws on the empirical estimation by [17]. It
is flat for managers whose portfolio return is well below that of the benchmark. When
the relative performance reaches about -8%, the flow function displays a convex “kink”
followed by an upward-sloping segment. When the relative performance reaches about
8%, the relationship again becomes flat. In Table 4.4 we allow these performance thresh-
olds to change and we record the effects of such changes on the liquidity premia. Note
that, liquidity premia increase when we reduce the differential θH − θL. When we reduce
θH − θL, we are essentially increasing the convexity of the flow function. Moreover, as
we decrease the (symmetric) relative performance range over which the flow function is
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Table 4.4: Liquidity Premia and Flow Characteristics
This table provides information on the liquidity premia for different parameter values of the fund flow function,
given different transaction cost rates (TC Rate = 1% in Panel A, and TC Rate = 2% in Panel B). The liquidity
premia are computed as the maximum expected return of the illiquid security that the fund manager is willing
to exchange for zero transaction costs. In Panel A, we present the case with a transaction cost rate of 1%, and
in Panel B the case with transaction cost rate of 2%. Both panels present the comparative statics of the liquidity
premia with respect to the implicit reward for outperformance, ρH − ρL, and the flow threshold differential,
θH − θL. We fixed the investment horizon T at 1 year. We calibrated the flow-performance function according
to the empirical estimations of [17]. We assume that the manager has an appetite for risk that translates into
γ = 4.0. We also show how the frequency of fund flows affects the liquidity premia results (flow freq = 1 and 2,
represent the cases with annual and semi-annual flows, respectively). The remaining baseline parameter values we
used are as follows: αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20, αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, κ = 0.0 and β=1.0.
Panel A: TC Rate = 1%
Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL
flow freq 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1
1 2.43% 2.64% 2.66% 2.50% 2.13%
2 6.55% 7.30% 7.55% 7.56% 7.57%
Flow Threshold: θH − θL
flow freq 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24
1 4.38% 3.41% 2.66% 1.95% 1.33%
2 10.66% 8.47% 7.55% 6.15% 5.21%
Panel B: TC Rate = 2%
Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL
flow freq 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1
1 3.40% 3.66% 3.56% 3.16% 2.57%
2 8.81% 10.15% 10.69% 10.80% 10.84%
Flow Threshold: θH − θL
flow freq 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24
1 6.52% 4.86% 3.56% 2.44% 1.61%
2 33.52% 13.58% 10.69% 8.25% 6.66%
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upward-sloping, the harder it gets for the fund manager to reach the convex “kink” in
the function. As a result, a reduction in θH−θL leads to stronger risk-shifting incentives,
larger deviations from the investor’s desired risk exposure (see Table 4.4), and additional
trading on the illiquid asset, which then commands a more expensive trading bill to the
mutual fund. Note how dramatically the liquidity premia can increase with reductions in
θH − θL. For instance, in the case in which flows happen on a semi-annual basis, and the
transaction costs rate is 2%, the LPTC ratio ranges from 3.33 to 16.76 as we decrease
θH − θL from 0.24 to 0.08.
Overall, we show that liquidity premia increases with respect to the transaction costs
and with respect to the frequency of fund flows. The liquidity premia generated by our
model are much larger than those found in [18], and transaction costs create a strong
first-order effect on liquidity premia.
4.3 Utility Costs of Portfolio Delegation
In this section, we analyze the utility implications on the part of an investor who dele-
gates the administration of her savings to an open-end fund manager, instead of investing
directly. By hiring the fund manager to administer her savings, the investor loses control
over the composition of the fund’s portfolio, and becomes subject to numerous misalign-
ments of objectives that can be very costly. A quantitative assessment of the investor’s
utility costs of portfolio delegation, in the presence of mutual fund flows and transaction
costs, is the purpose of this section.
In fact, the preferences of the investor and of the fund manager can be different along
several dimensions. On the one hand, the manager has explicit incentives to administer
the investor’s savings according to her own attitude towards risk, her (usually shorter)
investment horizon, and her (eventually more favorable) participation and transaction
costs. On the other hand, the manager has implicit incentives to manipulate the tracking
error of her portfolio in order to increase the likelihood that it will outperform the
benchmark, which subsequently allows the fund to sell additional shares to the investors
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and increase the amount of assets under management.
One of the advantages of taking a portfolio choice approach to study the problem of
an investor who delegates her investment decisions to a fund manager is that, it allows
us to approximate the welfare implications of such an arrangement.
We assume that the portfolio delegation decision is exogenous to the model. The
decision to delegate may be grounded on the assumption that, in comparison with the
individual investor, the manager is subject to lower opportunity costs for engaging in
active portfolio management, or better investing education, for instance.
We express the utility costs of portfolio delegation in monetary terms, by computing
certainty equivalent rate of return, which produces the same level of utility as that
obtained from delegating her investment decisions to the fund manager. Thus, utility
costs of delegation need to be calculated at the level of the investor’s centralized problem.
In other words, we use the value function of the investor to measure these utility losses.
Unlike the fund manager, the investor does not need to worry about periodic money
flows.2 Therefore, the investor’s problem is a special case of the manager’s problem, in
which the flow function is turned off, by setting ρ() = 1, and in which the investor’s risk
aversion can differ from that of the manager, which we then denote by γI , as opposed to
γ for the fund manager. We also assume, for simplicity, that the investment horizon of
both the investor and the manager is one year. In the case of a model without transaction
costs, the investor’s problem is similar to that in [51], except that our investor only cares
about maximizing her utility from terminal wealth, and that the investor is now subject
to various portfolio constraints.
We compute the certainty equivalent rate of return that the investor obtains when
investing directly, and comparing it with the certainty equivalent that the investor’s value
function would produce if using the optimal investment policies of the fund manager as
input. More formally, for a particular model setup, the certainty equivalent rate is the
2 The manager of an open-end fund bears a cost stemming from the liquidity service it provides to
its investors. The fund manager may be forced to engage in potentially damaging transactions due to
the fact that investors are allowed to readily buy and redeem shares of her fund.
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risk-free rate of return CE(pi) that makes the investor indifferent between following the
model policy pi over the investment horizon T and, alternatively, earning this risk-free
rate on the same initial investment over the same period. For an investor with CRRA
coefficient γI and initial wealth W (0), CE(pi) solves:
[CE(pi)W (0)]1−γI






where the superscript denotes that the final wealth W (T ) is attained under investment
policy pi, and the risk aversion parameter γI shows that the certainty equivalent is pro-
duced using the value function of the investor.3 We can then compute the cost to the
investor of switching from investment policy pi1 to pi2 as L(pi1, pi2) = CE(pi2)/CE(pi1)−1.
Note that a negative value of L(pi1, pi2) represents a utility loss of moving from policy pi1
to policy pi2.
4 If we take pi1 to be the optimal investment policy of the investor if she were
to invest directly, and pi2 the optimal policy of the fund manager given all her explicit
(risk appetite) and implicit (convex sensitivity of flows to past performance) incentives,
then a negative value of L(pi1, pi2) represents the extra amount of wealth (as a fraction
of the initial value) that one would need to give the investor for her to be indifferent
between delegating and investing directly.
To analyze the effect of transaction costs on the costs of portfolio delegation, we note
that transaction costs can either reduce or increase the manager’s risk taking, since the
no-trading region typically embraces the optimal policy in the absence of transaction
costs. However, in the case that the manager fully invests in the alternative asset, the
transaction costs indeed reduce the costs of portfolio displacement, which is particularly
costly to conservative investors.5 In addition, transaction costs bill directly consumes
3 In the presence of transaction costs, W0 and WT are replaced by x0 + y0 and xT + yT , respectively.
Note that CE(pi) depends on a particular investment policy that the investor uses as input to solve her
value function.
4 In this study, we focus on the costs associated with portfolio delegation. However, we do not rule
out the possibility that there are benefits associated with delegated portfolio management. In fact, the
investor’s decision to delegate is very likely motivated by those perceived benefits that we are excluding
from our analysis, for simplicity. We leave this interesting dimension of the problem for future research.
5The extreme case can happen, for example, when the manager has a small risk aversion or when the
4.3 Utility Costs of Portfolio Delegation 48
the investor’s wealth. The effect of transaction costs on the costs of portfolio delegation
is an aggregation of these aspects.
We distinguish two types of investors: “aggressive investor” and “conservative in-
vestor”. The former refers to those with smaller risk aversion parameter (similar with
that of the fund manager), while the later refers to those with significantly larger risk
aversion parameter. In the aggressive investor case, we set γ = γI = 3, while in the
conservative investor case we set γ = 3, and γI = 9 as the baseline parameter values.
In Table 4.5, we present the values of L(pi1, pi2) for different model parameters.
We present in Panel A and C the case with no transaction costs, and in Panel B and
D the case with a transaction costs rate of 1%. In Panel A1, B1, C1 and D1, we show
how the costs of portfolio delegation change with variations in the risk appetite of the
investor (while keeping the risk aversion parameter of the manager at γ = 3). Note that,
when fund flows are not taken into consideration (flow freq = 0), the investor’s utility
cost of portfolio delegation is due entirely to the explicit incentives of the fund manager,
arising from her different risk tolerance. Not surprisingly, the more the risk aversion of
the manager differs from that of the investor, the higher the cost for the investor from
delegating. For example, for γ = 3 and γI = 9, one would need to give the investor 6.19%
extra initial wealth for her to be indifferent between delegating and investing directly,
assuming zero transaction costs.
Panel A1, B1, C1, and D1, of Table 4.5, also include the costs of delegation for the
cases in which implicit incentives are present (flow freq = 1 and 2). Typically, as the
frequency of flows increases, the costs of delegation also increase. The increase in the
frequency of flows reduces the time window over which the manager can shift the risk
of her portfolio in order to increase the likelihood of future inflows. A shorter risk-
shifting window induces the manager to create more extreme portfolios, which leads to
larger costs of portfolio displacement. Meanwhile, the manager needs to pay a heavier
transaction costs bill, which leads to larger costs of transaction bill. As a result, the
costs of portfolio delegation increases with the frequency of flows.
time is close to flow date. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 provide such examples.
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When we include transaction costs, we find that typically the aggressive investor
suffers from larger utility loss, while the conservative investor, on the contrary, could
benefit from transaction costs and experience less utility loss. For example, when γ =
γI = 3, transaction costs induce additional 26 basis points in the utility loss in the annual
flow case, and additional 114 basis points in the utility loss in the semi-annual flow case;
when γ = 3 and γI = 9, transaction costs save 301 basis points in the annual flow case
and 201 basis points in the semi-annual flow case.
In Panel A2, B2, C2 and D2, we show how the delegation costs change with the
correlation between the returns of the risky assets. Clearly, when both the implicit
incentives (flow freq = 0) and the explicit incentives (γ = γI = 3) of the fund manager
are absent, the investor’s delegation costs are null. However, delegation cost arises when
the manager has implicit incentives. In particular, in Panel A2 and B2 of Table 4.5,
we show that the manager’s portfolio distortions are more severe when the correlation
between the returns of the risky assets is more negative. This is most likely due to the
manager’s wider risk-shifting window when correlation is negative, compared to when it is
positive. In Panel C2 and D2, we show such relation is broken by the inclusion of explicit
incentives, which are mixed with the implicit incentives in a subtle way. Nonetheless, it
still holds that the transaction costs increase the utility loss of aggressive investor, while
reduce the utility loss of conservative investor.
In Panel A3, B3, C3 and D3, we show how the delegation costs change with the
volatility of the illiquid risky asset. Without explicit incentives, it is not surprising to
see that, as the volatility of the illiquid risky asset decreases, the manager’s portfolio
distortions get more severe, and the costs of delegation increase. In fact, the tilt of
portfolio towards the alternative asset should be stronger when the alternative asset is
less volatile, as that is the only way available to the manager in order to obtain larger
tracking error with respect to the benchmark. In Panel C3 and D3, we show again that
such relation is broken by the explicit incentives.
In Panel A4, B4, C4 and D4, we show how the costs of delegation change with the
riskiness of the benchmark portfolio. In order to outperform a benchmark portfolio that
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is more aggressive, the manager needs to take larger position in the alternative asset.
Therefore, without explicit incentives, it is natural to see in Panel A4 and B4 that the
delegation costs increase with the riskiness of the benchmark portfolio. In Panels C4 and
D4, we show once again how explicit incentives could break this monotonic relation.
In Table 4.6 we present the sensitivity of the costs of delegation to changes in the
characteristics of the flow function.
This table shows that, without explicit incentives, the costs of delegation increase
with the reward for outperformance, ρH − ρL. This means that, when under-performing
the benchmark, the fund manager deviates more from the investor’s desired risk exposure
when the expected reward for such gamble is larger. These results are consistent with
those presented in [8]. However, the monotonic relation can be broken by the explicit
incentives.
Table 4.6 also shows that, without explicit incentives, the costs of delegation typically
decrease as we expand the region over which flows increase with relative performance,
θH − θL. When we expand the differential θH − θL, we are essentially reducing the
convexity of the flow function. This in turn reduces the incentives for risk-shifting on
the part of the fund manager. In fact, as θH − θL increases, it becomes easier for the
fund manager to reach the upward-sloping part of the flow function.
Note that our results with respect to changes in θH − θL go in the opposite direction
of those presented in [8], which is possibly due to various portfolio constraint imposed in
our model. Also note that the utility loss is generally reduced by the transaction costs,
in the case of conservative investors.
In summary, we find that the implicit incentives could considerably amplify the utility
costs of portfolio delegation. Transaction costs would further increase the delegation
costs when the investor is less risk averse. However, transaction costs could reduce the
delegation costs when the investor is more conservative, which is typically the case in
reality.
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Table 4.6: Flow Characteristics and Delegation Costs
This table shows how the portfolio delegation costs are affected by the characteristics of the flow-performance
function. We show the results of the aggressive investor case, i.e., the case with γI = γ = 3, in the upper panel,
and the results of the conservative investor case, i.e., the case with γI = 9, γ = 3, in the lower panel. In Panel A
and C, we present the case with no transaction costs, and in Panel B and D the case with transaction cost rate
equal to 1%. All the panels present the comparative statics of the delegation costs with respect to the implicit
reward for outperformance, as measured by ρH − ρL, and the flow threshold differential, given by θH − θL. We
also show how the frequency of fund flows affects the costs of delegation (flow freq = 1 and 2 represent the cases
with annual and semi-annual flows, respectively). We fixed the investment horizon T at 1 year. The baseline
parameter values we used are as follows: ρH = −0.20, ρL = 0.50, θH = −0.08, θL = 0.08, αL = 0.11, σL = 0.20,
αI = 0.18, σI = 0.37, κ = 0.0, and β = 1.0.
Panel: Aggressive investors
Panel A: TC Rate = 0% Panel B: TC Rate = 1%
A1. Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL B1. Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL
flow freq 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1
1 -1.44% -1.56% -1.61% -1.68% -1.77% -1.61% -1.80% -1.87% -1.94% -2.01%
2 -2.11% -2.57% -2.73% -2.80% -2.83% -2.55% -3.10% -3.43% -3.61% -3.68%
A2. Flow Threshold: θH − θL B2. Flow Threshold: θH − θL
flow freq 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24
1 -2.28% -1.91% -1.61% -1.39% -1.26% -2.64% -2.23% -1.87% -1.60% -1.42%
2 -2.90% -2.83% -2.73% -2.56% -2.35% -3.50% -3.48% -3.43% -3.21% -2.75%
Panel: Conservative Investors
Panel C: TC Rate = 0% Panel D: TC Rate = 1%
C1. Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL D1. Reward for Outperf.: ρH − ρL
flow freq 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1
1 -8.60% -8.87% -8.79% -8.64% -8.53% -7.64% -7.95% -7.88% -7.78% -7.77%
2 -9.44% -10.56% -11.10% -11.42% -11.59% -8.09% -9.42% -10.29% -10.80% -11.04%
C2. Flow Threshold: θH − θL D2. Flow Threshold: θH − θL
flow freq 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24
1 -9.80% -9.39% -8.79% -8.14% -7.58% -9.32% -8.73% -7.88% -7.15% -6.69%
2 -10.51% -10.85% -11.10% -11.13% -10.98% -9.69% -10.13% -10.29% -10.06% -9.23%
Part II




The General Framework and Bond
Pricing
Now we turn our attention to the modeling of the U.S. short-term yields.
5.1 The General Framework
We will work on a complete probability space (Ω,Ft, ·), where Ω is the sample space, Ft
is the filtration that satisfies the usual conditions and · means all possible probability
measures. We assume the instantaneous spot rate r(t) is given by
r(t) = K(t) + J(t), (5.1)
where K(t) can be any type of continuous diffusion whose dynamics is left unspecified for
now,1 and J(t) is a pure jump process which models the random level shifts. We assume
under the pricing measure Q, J(t) evolves according to J(t) = J0
∏N(t)
i=1 Xi, where N(t) is
a time homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ and Xis are i.i.d. positive random
variables with density fX(x) defined on R
+. We assume independence between K(t) and
1In the following, with a slight abuse of notation, we will also use K(t) to denote the vector of actual
state variables when it does not lead to any confusion.
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J(t). Specifically, we assume the innovations in K(t), the Poisson process N(t) and the
percentage jump size Xis are mutually independent.
Note that our model allows the occurrence of downward jumps without introducing
negative J . Meanwhile, if K(t) is mean reverting with long term mean η, the short
rate r(t) will temporarily have mean reverting level J(t) + η at time t. In addition, this
temporal mean reverting level randomly changes over time, which resembles the level
shifts actually observed in the data.
Our model differs from the classic jump-diffusion model




Specifically, there is no long term effect of jumps in (5.2) due to the mean reverting
term in the drift, especially when the speed parameter a(t) is large; On the contrary, the
effects of jumps in our model are persistent before new jump. As a result, our model can
match the long term level shifts more closely.
Figure 5.1 shows one sample path simulated from our model. The left and the middle
panel depict the diffusion and jump component, respectively, and the right panel depicts
the spot rate r(t). It can be clearly observed that jumps in J(t) cause the level shifts in
r(t).
5.2 Bond Pricing
According to the standard pricing theory, the time t value of a zero coupon bond with
maturity T is given by



























, U¯(t, T,K(t)) · V¯ (t, T, J(t))
where the second equality is due to the independence. In the time homogeneous case,
we set U¯(t, T,K) = U(τ,K) and V¯ (t, T, J) = V (τ, J), respectively, where τ = T − t is
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Figure 5.1: A Simulated Sample Path
In the simulation the factorK(t) is modeled as single factor square root diffusion process: dK(t) =
k(θ −K(t))dt + σ√K(t)dW (t), and the jump size Xs are modeled as i.i.d. log-normal random
variables LN(µ, ν). Parameter values: k = 2, θ = 0.02, σ = 0.05, δ = 0.7782, µ = −0.4791,
ν = 1.0686, T = 5, K0 = 0.01, J0 = 0.02.
the time to maturity. We first focus on the “level component” V (τ, J).
5.2.1 The Bond Pricing Equation
Since our model deviates from the affine jump-diffusion framework of [32], the bond price
does not admit analytic formula. Instead, we have the following
Proposition 5.1. (Bond pricing equation) The function V (τ, J) solves the ordinary
integro-differential equation (OIDE)
−∂τV − (λ+ J)V + λ
∫
Dx
V (τ, Jx)fX(x)dx = 0, 0 < τ ≤ T, 0 < J <∞
V (0, J) = 1, V (τ, 0) = 1, limJ→∞ V (τ, J) = 0.
(5.3)
where Dx ⊂ R+ is the support of percentage jump size X.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
(5.3) can be solved efficiently using the numerical method presented in Appendix A.2.
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5.2.2 Short Maturity Approximation
Recall that we are particular interested in short-term bonds. The following proposition
provides approximations when the bond has short time-to-maturity.
Proposition 5.2. (Short maturity approximation) For a bond with short maturity ∆t,
we have







In addition, if EQ[X3] <∞, we have the analytic approximation








Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We conduct several numerical experiments to test the accuracy of the approximations.
We consider maturities ranging from one month to one year and assume the jump size
Xs are log-normally distributed with parameter (µ, ν).2 In all these experiments, the
benchmark values are computed via (5.3) with grid size dt = dz = 0.002.3 We test three
groups of parameters. In the first group Xs have expectation of unity: E[X] = 14, while
in the second and third group they have expectations greater than or less than unity,




We consider both small jump intensity (λ = 0.3) and large jump intensity (λ = 1.5). We
report two relative errors for each group of parameters. The first error is produced by
the integral formula and the second is produced by the analytic formula.
These numerical experiments confirm the accuracy of approximation formulas. With
reasonable parameter values, the relative error are within 0.05% even for large jump
2Throughout this study we will always make this distributional assumptions about X. It is straight-
forward to extend the analysis to other distributions.
3We also calculate the same quantities with finer grid size. The results are virtually identical to those
obtained with aforementioned grid size.
4Note that in the log-normal case the condition E[X] = 1 is equivalent to µ = −0.5ν2.
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Table 5.1: Relative Error of Short Maturity Approximations
This table presents the relative error of two short maturity approximations in proposition 5.2,
compared to the benchmark value. The benchmark values are computed from the OIDE using
finite difference method. “Int.” means one dimensional integral approximation and “Ana.” means
analytic approximation. Parameter values: ν = 1.5, µ = −0.5ν2 + b, J0 = 0.01.
λ = 0.3
b = −0.3 b = 0.0 b = 0.3
Maturity Int. Ana. Int. Ana. Int. Ana.
1m -7.43E-08 4.81E-09 -2.06E-07 -5.92E-09 -4.89E-07 -4.44E-09
3m -5.38E-08 6.73E-08 -5.52E-07 -1.87E-07 -1.10E-06 -1.30E-07
6m 8.14E-07 5.72E-07 -1.41E-06 -1.54E-06 -1.82E-06 -1.42E-06
1y 8.31E-06 5.43E-06 -8.21E-06 -1.19E-05 -1.02E-05 -1.40E-05
λ = 1.5
b = −0.3 b = 0.0 b = 0.3
Maturity Int. Ana. Int. Ana. Int. Ana.
1m -2.63E-07 1.33E-07 -1.05E-06 -5.10E-08 -2.30E-06 1.21E-07
3m 2.55E-06 3.16E-06 -3.92E-06 -2.09E-06 -3.94E-06 8.97E-07
6m 2.56E-05 2.43E-05 -2.06E-05 -2.12E-05 -1.56E-05 -1.56E-05
1y 2.08E-04 1.94E-04 -1.73E-04 -1.91E-04 -2.68E-04 -2.87E-04
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intensity λ = 1.5 and for maturity of one year. In addition, the performance is the best
when the jump size has unity expectation. The performance of both approximations
tend to decline when the expectation of jump biases away from unity.
Chapter6
Affine Yield Models with Random Level
Shifts: Estimation and Forecast
In order to complete the model, we need to specify the dynamics of K(t). In this study,
we consider the celebrated affine yield models, proposed by [31], as the candidates. Affine
yield models are popular due to their excellent flexibility and tractability. In addition,
affine yield models can be effectively estimated using maximum likelihood method (c.f.
[2]). Building our model on affine yield models allows us to take advantage of their
tractability. Meanwhile, a comparison between the affine yield models with or without
random level shifts helps to reveal the advantage of including the random level shifts.
We build our model on the canonical forms studied in [25]. Since we focus on the
short-term yields, we confine ourselves with models in which the number of factors is at
most two.1 A brief description of one and two-factor affine yield models is provided in
Appendix A.5.
1In the literature, three factor models are usually used to describe the whole term structure of interest
rates, e.g., [25], [6] and many others.
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6.1 Parameter Estimation
In this section we discuss the estimation issue. Estimating models with random level
shifts turns out to be nontrivial. The main difficulty lies in that: (1) the level process
J(t) is unobservable and no commonly available proxy exists for it2; (2) J(t) should
ideally be piecewise constant. As a result, the implementation of such models require
special treatment.
We propose a new approach to estimate the models with random level shifts. Firstly,
we construct a path of J(t) directly from the data a priori. Consequently the P -measure
jump parameters, including the jump intensity parameter and jump size parameters, are
obtained from that path. Secondly, we obtain the estimates of the remaining parameters
by maximizing the likelihood of selected panels of yields conditioning on the path of J(t).
The construction of J(t) is discussed in detail in the empirical study in the next chapter.
6.1.1 Estimating P -Measure Parameters in J(t)
Once the path of J(t) is constructed, estimating the P -measure parameters in J(t) is
straightforward. To assign market price of jump risk to the model, we follow [53], [43]
and assume that under measure P , J(t) is also a jump process of the same type, but
with possibly different intensity λP and the jump size X has another density function
fPX(x). Although the exact transition density of J(t) is not available in closed form, when
the time step ∆ between consecutive observations is small, the following approximative
transition density could be adopted




where D(·) is the Dirac δ-function.3 It can be verified that T J∆(J |Jt) is indeed a den-
sity function. Due to the Bayesian rule, the likelihood of the path of J(t) is given by
2Sometimes even a financial variable is unobservable, commonly accepted proxy could exist. For
example, in the case of stochastic volatility, at-the-money implied volatility is widely used as proxy for
the unobservable spot volatility process.
3To test the accuracy of the approximated density, we simulate the true distributional function of
x = J(t+ ∆t)/J(t) and compare it with the above approximated distribution. We set the path number




∆(Ji+1|Ji). Meanwhile, we can replace this transition density by another function
which does not involve δ-function.




∆(Ji+1|Ji), where T J∆ is spec-









Proof. See Appendix A.4.
6.1.2 Estimating the Remaining Parameters
In order to estimate the Q-measure parameters in J(t) and in K(t) (denoted by Θ(J)
and Θ(K), respectively), and the P -measure parameters in K(t) (denoted by ΘP (K)),
we maximize the likelihood of certain panel of yields conditioning on the pre-constructed
J(t). This method is a variant of the standard MLE method for the affine yield models.
First note that if K(t) is affine, the price of a zero coupon bond with time-to-maturity
τ can be expressed as
P (K,J, τ ; Θ(J),Θ(K)) = exp
[−C0(τ ; Θ(K))− C(τ ; Θ(K))′K]V (τ, J ; Θ(J))
where K is a column vector containing the state variables in the diffusion component4
and C(τ ; Θ(K)) = (C1(τ ; Θ(K)), ..., CN (τ ; Θ(K)))
T is a column vector containing the
loading of each factor. To estimate an N -factor affine yield model with random level
shifts, we use bond prices P TMi with maturities TM ,M = 1, ..., N + N0. Given Θ
P (K),
Θ(K) and Θ(J), we calculate the conditional likelihood as follows
Algorithm 1: calculate the conditional likelihood of yields
at 1E+08, run the simulation 5 times and calculate the average error (A.E.), maximum absolute error
(M.A.E.) and their standard errors (S.E.). The average error is at the level of 1E-07 and the maximum
absolute error is at the level of 1E-06. Therefore the approximation is indeed good enough for our
estimation purpose.
4Here we slightly abuse the notation K(t). K(t) (or K) here in fact represents the state variables
that form the affine component K(t).
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For each day i and M = 1, ..., N +N0,
→ Computing the level component of bond price V (TM , Ji; Θ(J)),






→ Solving the N ×N linear system
C0(TM ,Θ(K)) + C(TM ,Θ(K))
′Ki = − lnP TMK,i ,M = 1, ..., N
to obtain the state variable Ki,
Then for i = 1, ..., n− 1,
→ Calculating the one step transition densities lK(Ki,Ki+1; ΘP (K),Θ(K),Θ(J))







→ For M = N + 1, ..., N + N0, calculating the cross-sectional pricing error of the
diffusion component
eM,i = C0(TM ,Θ(K)) + C(TM ,Θ(K))
′Ki + lnP TMK,i
and assuming that eM,i ∼ N(0, σM ) are i.i.d random variables.
→ Calculate the likelihood of the yield produced by diffusion component, accounting
for the cross-sectional error
Ly(Θ









where C(Θ(K)) is an N × N matrix defined as C(i, j; Θ(K)) = Ci(Tj ; Θ(K)), i, j =
1, ..., N , n is the number of observations and φ(x, σM ) is the density function of N(0, σM ),




End of Algorithm 1.
The estimates of (ΘP (K),Θ(K),Θ(J), σM ) are then given by
(ΘP (K)∗,Θ(K)∗,Θ(J)∗, σ∗M ) = argmax
ΘP (K),Θ(K),Θ(J),σM
Ly(Θ
P (K),Θ(K),Θ(J), σM )
5
5Excluding the cross-sectional error, the quantity Ly is in fact the likelihood of the panel of yields
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6.2 Forecasting the Bond Price
In affine yield models it is convenient to forecast the bond yield directly. However,
with the random level shifts this is difficult due to the lack of closed form solution.
As an alternative, we choose to forecast the bond price. At a fixed time T0, given
(KT0 , JT0), the forecasted bond price with maturity L and forecasting length S is de-
fined as EPT0 [f(L,KT0+S , JT0+S)] , where f(τ,K, J) is the bond pricing function implied
by the model and the expectation is taken under measure P . Since the pricing func-
tion f(τ,K, J) is separable in the affine yield models with level shifts: f(τ,K, J) =
U(τ,K)V (τ, J), due to the independence between K(t) and J(t) again we have
EPT0 [f(L,KT0+S , JT0+S)] = E
P
T0 [U(L,KT0+S)] · EPT0 [V (L, JT0+S)]
The first expectation is discussed in Appendix A.5. To calculate the second expectation,
since J(t) is Markovian, we define g(t, Jt) = E
P
t [V (L, JT0+S)] for T0 ≤ t ≤ T0+S. Similar






(g(t, Jx)− g(t, J)) fPX(x)dx = 0,
g(T0 + S, J) = V (L, J), g(t, 0) = 1.
(6.2)
in the domain {(t, J) : T0 ≤ t ≤ T0 + S, 0 < J < ∞}. Since (6.2) is of the same type as
(5.3), it could be solved analogously.
conditioning on the path of J(t). Note that the total continuous yield is given by Y (T ) = − lnP (T ) =
C0(T ) + C(T )
′K − lnV (T, J). Therefore conditioning on J(t) the likelihood of Y (T ) is given by the
likelihood of K(t) divided by the Jacobian determinant. In addition, since we choose the objective
parameters in J(t) which maximize the likelihood of the path of J(t), the entire set of parameters
effectively maximizes the joint likelihood of yield data and J(t).
Chapter7
Empirical Application: the U.S. T-Bill
Market
7.1 The Data
We obtain the treasury bill yields from the U.S. department of treasury, with maturities
of one month, three months, six months and one year. These data are available on
daily frequency and are divided into the in sample part and the out-of-sample part. The
in sample period extends from January 2002 to December 2009, with a total of 2000
observations, for estimation purpose. The data from January 2010 to December 2011,
with 500 observations in total, are reserved for conducting out-of-sample tests.
Most major economical or political events occur during the in sample period, thus the
in sample data contain most of the level shifting points. The yields stay at extremely low
level during the out-of-sample period. Therefore the out-of-sample data set represents
the post-crisis low rate environment.
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Figure 7.1: One Month Yield and the Jumps
This figure depicts the time series of U.S. one month yield from January 04 2002 to December 31
2009, together with the identified important dates when the yield exhibited significant jumps.
7.2 Construction of the Level Process
In order to construct the path of the unobservable process J(t), we first determine the
time points when jumps occur. The detection of jumps in time series data is usually
a complicated issue (cf. [41] and [1]). In this study we employ a simple and intuitive
approach: we choose the yield with the shortest maturity as R and compare its spot
move ∆R with its 75-day historical mean µ75d(∆R) and standard deviation σ75d(∆R).
1
When |∆R−µ75d(∆R)| ≥ 5σ75d(∆R), we consider it as a jump.2 This approach enables
us to focus on those significant and abrupt jumps at the cost of ignoring some small
jumps. To investigate whether these jumps are related to major market events, we mark
the dates when jumps occurred in Figure 7.1 and summarize the events which happened
on these dates in Table 7.1.
1We have also considered other choice of the length of the moving window, such as 50 days or 100
days. The results are very similar to those presented here.
2The choice of threshold 5 is not accidental. In fact, J. Liu, F. A. Longstaff and J. Pan (2003)
employed a similar procedure to determine the jumps in the U.S. equity return. In their study, 5 is also
chosen as the threshold.
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Table 7.1: News Release and Jumps in Short-term Yield
This table reports the dates when the jumps are detected in the U.S. one month treasury yield,
the changes in the yield, and the released news near these dates.
Date Yield Move Events
11-6-2002 -20bps 1. Board approval of the discount rate requests of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
effective immediately, and of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, effective from 7 November
2002.
2. Board approval of the discount rate requests of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York
and Dallas, effective immediately.
3. The Federal Reserve cut a key short-term interest rate more than most analysts expected.
5-21-2003 +12bps 1. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan repeated his belief that the U.S. economy is
poised for stronger growth, though businesses remain cautious and a remote risk of deflation
remains.
2. Greenspan assured the congressional Joint Economic Committee that the central bank has
other resources to influence interest rate. He implied that Fed would begin to buy long-term
Treasury securities.
12-26-2003 -11bps 1. Robert McTeer, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, said Friday the threat of
inflation to the U.S. economy is distant, but if it draws closer, the central bank will be able
to raise interest rates gradually.
4-22-2004 -12bps 1. Governor Ben S. Bernanke presented “The economic outlook and monetary policy” at the
Bond Market Association Annual Meeting, New York.
12-31-2004 +21bps 1. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Annual Report, was published.
9-21-2005 -27bps 1. “The great rate debate” on the Fed’s high short-term rate policy.
12-5-2006 -25bps 1. The “rate cut talk” began.
6-21-2007 -25bps 1. The Federal Reserve cut a key interest rate after closed-door two-day meeting of the Fed’s
chief policy-making group, the Federal Open Market Committee.
8-16-2007 -105bps 1. A conference call of the Federal Open Market Committee was held.
2. Fitch Ratings downgrades Countrywide Financial Corporation to BBB+, its third lowest
investment-grade rating, and Countrywide borrows the entire $11.5 billion available in its
credit lines with other banks.
9-15-2008 -101bps 1. Bank of America announces its intent to purchase Merrill Lynch & Co. for $50 billion.
2. Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
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Table 7.1 shows that our detected jumps are indeed related to market events. Note
that though the largest jumps are related to the degradation of Countrywide Financial
Corporation, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, other jumps are mainly caused
by the actions of Federal Reserve, which could affect the short-term yields by adjusting
the federal funds rate.
Next we determine the implicit level between jumps. Since Kt = rt − Jt is diffusion
driven by Brownian motions, its theoretical cubic variation is 0. Therefore we choose the
levels such that the sample cubic variation is minimized.
Algorithm 2: Determining the level process J(t) in the in sample data set
S1. Denote the in sample data of short rate (or its proxy) as Ri, i = 1, ..., n.
S2. Set τ0 = 1 and J1 = α0, denote the jump times as τ1 < τ2 < ... < τm, set Jτi = αi;
and for τi−1 ≤ i < τi, Ji = Jτi−1 .
S3. Choose αj ∈ [, Rτj ], j = 0, ...,m such that the following objective function is
minimized




where Cv is the sample cubic variation.3
End of Algorithm 2
We show the constructed J(t) together with the one month T-bill yield in Figure
7.1. This figure shows that J(t) indeed captures the major trend of level shifts of one
month yield. In addition, the ratio between the cubic variation of the residual yield and
the original yield is about 70%, which suggests that 30% of the sample cubic variation
could be attributed to the jumps and the remaining 70% could be attributed to discrete
sampling.
3In this algorithm, we choose =1e-8 as the lower bound for J . We cap αj at Rτj to ensure the
constructed J(t) is meaningful. We divide the cubic variation of the residual by the cubic variation of
the original data to improve the performance of optimization procedure.
7.3 Parameter Estimates 69
7.3 Parameter Estimates
To estimate the models, we consider the market price of risk specifications proposed in
[25] and in [16]. These market prices of risk are listed in Table A.2 in Appendix A.5.
There are several parameter restrictions in the market price of risk and [16] discuss these
restrictions comprehensively.
We estimate all the five models using the entire spectrum of T-bill yields. In par-
ticular, for one factor model A0(1) and A1(1), a zero-coupon bond yield with maturity
of one month is assumed to be observed without error; zero-coupon bond yields with
maturities of three, six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with error. For
two factor model A0(2), A1(2) and A2(2), zero-coupon bond yields with maturity of one
month and three months are assumed to be observed without error; zero-coupon bond
yields with maturities of six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with error.
Table 7.2 - 7.6 show the parameter estimates of each model. A few points could be
noted by looking at the parameter estimates. First, with the same model and risk premi-
um specification, some parameters differ significantly between the cases with or without
random level shifts. This fact confirms that introducing random level shifts changes the
structural fit to some extent (if not largely). Second, the in sample cross-sectional pric-
ing errors for DS and CFK market price of risk are similar, which is consistent with the
findings in [16]. The in sample cross-sectional pricing errors are typically reduced in the
models with random level shifts. This could be attributed to the increasing number of
parameters introduced by random level shifts.
7.4 Out-of-sample Performance
It is well known that the models with more parameters may not perform better out-of-
sample due to the data-snooping bias ([47]). We conduct out-of-sample tests to compare
and evaluate the models with or without random level shifts. We focus on two aspects
of out-of-sample performance: bond price forecast and cross-sectional pricing. These are
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Table 7.2: Parameter Estimates: A0(1)
This table shows the parameter estimates for the A0(1) model parameters, for the [25] and [16]
market price of risk specifications, with/without random level shifts. A zero-coupon bond yield
with maturity of one month is assumed to be observed without error; zero-coupon bond yields
with maturities of three, six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with error.
DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Parameter
b11 -0.1181 -0.1297 -0.2745 -0.1158
c10 -0.8230 -0.7374 -0.7384 -0.5521
c11 0 0 -0.1565 0.0134
δ0 0.0035 0.0050 0.0135 0.0237
δ1 0.0140 0.0130 0.0140 0.0130
σ3m 3.57e-04 3.54e-04 3.57e-04 3.54e-04
σ6m 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
σ1y 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0029
λQ - 0.8877 - 0.3075
µQ - -1.7016 - -1.3420
νQ - 2.0276 - 2.0694
λP - 1.5008 - 1.5008
µP - -0.9137 - -0.9137
νP - 2.9952 - 2.9952
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Table 7.3: Parameter Estimates: A1(1)
This table shows the parameter estimates for the A1(1) model parameters, for the [25] and [16]
market price of risk specifications, with/without random level shifts. A zero-coupon bond yield
with maturity of one month is assumed to be observed without error; zero-coupon bond yields
with maturities of three, six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with error.
DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Parameter
a1 5.7552 2.9419 6.0415 3.0245
b11 -0.2917 -0.4616 -0.3045 -0.3784
c10 -0.1746 -0.3319 -0.1874 -0.2480
c11 0 0 0.2839 -0.0455
δ0 -0.0450 -0.0251 -0.0451 -0.0260
δ1 0.0030 0.0046 0.0030 0.0045
σ3m 3.57e-04 3.54e-04 3.57e-04 3.54e-04
σ6m 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
σ1y 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0029
λQ - 0.0843 - 0.0189
µQ - -0.1886 - 1.7083
νQ - 1.9463 - 1.6431
λP - 1.5008 - 1.5008
µP - -0.9137 - -0.9137
νP - 2.9952 - 2.9952
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Table 7.4: Parameter Estimates: A0(2)
This table shows the parameter estimates for the A0(2) model parameters, for the [25] and [16]
market price of risk specifications, with/without random level shifts. Zero-coupon bond yields
with maturity of one month and three months are assumed to be observed without error; zero-
coupon bond yields with maturities of six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with
error.
DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Parameter
b11 -9.8579 -11.0066 -28.3566 -28.2392
b21 12.8974 14.7638 9.7185 11.7928
b22 -0.2617 -0.1413 -0.0013 -0.3874
c10 -0.0819 0.2209 46.7569 0.2326
c11 0 0 -18.3663 -17.3434
c12 0 0 0.2931 0.1778
c20 1.2079 0.8463 -18.7054 0.7513
c21 0 0 -3.1645 -3.0404
c22 0 0 -0.1245 -0.4837
δ0 0.0128 0.0061 -1.5484 0.0098
δ1 0.0201 0.0195 0.0207 0.0198
δ2 -0.0104 -0.0102 -0.0098 -0.0099
σ6m 5.90e-04 5.66e-04 5.89e-04 5.66e-04
σ1y 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
λQ - 0.4738 - 0.4742
µQ - -1.7229 - -1.7246
νQ - 2.1306 - 2.1287
λP - 1.5008 - 1.5008
µP - -0.9137 - -0.9137
νP - 2.9952 - 2.9952
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Table 7.5: Parameter Estimates: A1(2)
This table shows the parameter estimates for the A1(2) model parameters, for the [25] and [16]
market price of risk specifications, with/without random level shifts. Zero-coupon bond yields
with maturity of one month and three months are assumed to be observed without error; zero-
coupon bond yields with maturities of six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with
error.
DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Parameter
a1 2.9250 0.5941 3.5941 0.6093
b11 -0.5050 -0.7201 -0.6084 -0.6962
b21 308.5440 495.9900 332.4356 206.9053
b22 -8.9043 -8.9474 -13.7881 -9.0337
β 583.2385 1196.7392 298.8599 202.1047
c10 0 0 0.6578 0.0103
c11 -0.2323 -0.5158 -0.3356 -0.4935
c20 -0.0169 -0.0130 36.2752 -0.2165
c21 -9.8569 -15.5815 105.3954 -3.8151
c22 0 0 -4.8825 -0.0565
δ0 -0.0243 -0.0059 -0.0226 -0.0060
δ1 -0.0037 -0.0097 -0.0036 -0.0097
δ2 3.11e-04 5.65e-04 4.33e-04 0.0014
σ6m 5.89e-04 5.67e-04 5.89e-04 5.67e-04
σ1y 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
λQ - 0.4958 - 0.1640
µQ - -1.3732 - -0.5062
νQ - 2.0515 - 1.9758
λP - 1.5008 - 1.5008
µP - -0.9137 - -0.9137
νP - 2.9952 - 2.9952
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Table 7.6: Parameter Estimates: A2(2)
This table shows the parameter estimates for the A2(2) model parameters, for the [25] and [16]
market price of risk specifications, with/without random level shifts. Zero-coupon bond yields
with maturity of one month and three months are assumed to be observed without error; zero-
coupon bond yields with maturities of six and twelve months are assumed to be observed with
error.
DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Parameter
a1 22.4638 1.7793 26.1829 0.7774
b11 -0.3416 -0.3572 -0.3583 -0.1470
b12 6.69e-39 3.55e-39 2.49e-63 1.05e-40
a2 2.12e-25 2.38e-39 10.3871 25.3690
b21 17.5402 23.4704 23.6814 38.8834
b22 -9.6499 -8.5783 -13.4085 -9.1367
c10 0 0 1.5009 -0.0025
c11 -0.0768 -0.0018 -0.0936 0.0562
c12 0 0 -8.74e-06 -1.34e-10
c20 0 0 9.8871 -0.0147
c21 0 0 6.5020 -2.89e-04
c22 -0.0923 -0.3294 -3.8178 -0.1836
δ0 -0.1195 -0.0183 -0.1265 -0.0267
δ1 -0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0011 -0.0097
δ2 0.0018 0.0065 0.0017 0.0064
σ6m 5.89e-04 5.89e-04 5.89e-04 5.68e-04
σ1y 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
λQ - 0.7036 - 0.5705
µQ - -0.5283 - -1.5478
νQ - 0.8442 - 2.0676
λP - 1.5008 - 1.5008
µP - -0.9137 - -0.9137
νP - 2.9952 - 2.9952
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standard perspectives in evaluating asset pricing models out-of-sample, e.g., [5]. Alter-
native out-of-sample evaluation methods include density forecast in [36].
We construct the level process J(t) during the out-of-sample period as follows. We
denote the value of J(t) on the day right before the first day in the out-of-sample period
by J0. For each day i in the out-of-sample period, we determine Ji day by day as follows:
1) if there is no jump occurring on day i,4 we set Ji = Ji−1;







where 1 ≤ k ≤ i, and Cv is the sample cubic variation as before. We emphasis that in
the objective function (7.2), the information from day 0 to day i− 1 is fixed. Note that
the procedure during the out-of-sample period is slightly different from that during the
in sample period, since exploiting future information is prohibited in the out-of-sample
test. The above procedure only uses the information up to day i to determine Ji.
With the constructed J(t), we identify the state variables from observed yields. First-
ly, we compute the level component and discount it away from the original bond price.
Secondly, we identify the state variables in the affine yield model from the residual price.
In particular, we identify the single state variable in A0(1) and A1(1) from one month
price and the two state variables in A0(2), A1(2) and A2(2) from one month price and
three months price. After these state variables are obtained, we use them together with
the estimated parameters as input to calculate the respective quantities.
A direct consequence of the aforementioned approach is that the models are not fitted
to extra yields even with random level shifts. For example, A0(1) is only fitted to one
month yield, and A0(2) is only fitted to one month yield and three month yield, regardless
of the presence or absence of J(t). As such, we are able to conduct fair out-of-sample
comparison in time series and in cross-section.
4The criteria for detecting jumps in the out-of-sample set is the same as that in the in sample set.
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Bond Price Forecast
For one factor models A0(1) and A1(1), we calculate their forecasted price of bond
matured in one month, and for two factor models A0(2), A1(2) and A2(2), we calculate
their forecasted prices of bonds matured in one month and in three months. The forecast
length is set at five, ten or twenty business days. We calculate the model implied expected
values, subtract them from the observed values and then take the absolute values to
obtain the absolute forecast errors. This procedure is repeated for every day in the out-
of-sample period and the absolute errors are averaged to form the average absolute error.
In addition, we calculate the standard deviation of these absolute errors and divide it by
the number of forecasts to approximate the standard deviation of the average absolute
error. The standard deviation is useful to determine the statistical significance.
Cross-sectional Pricing
In order to calculate the cross-sectional pricing error, we base on the state variables and
calculate the model implied prices of bonds with different maturities on the same day,
then subtract them from the observed true bond prices. The cross-section consists of the
bonds matured at three months, six months and twelve months for A0(1) and A1(1), and
the bonds matured at six months and twelve months for A0(2), A1(2) and A2(2). After
obtaining the pricing error, we perform a similar averaging procedure across all the days
in the out-of-sample period to obtain the average absolute error. Its associated standard
deviation is calculated analogously.
Results and Discussions
Table 7.7 - 7.11 show the results. Table 7.7 and 7.8 show that for one factor models
A0(1) and A1(1), the forecast performance is generally not significantly improved. In
the case of A0(1) with DS market price of risk, the forecast performance is even slightly
degraded, although statistically insignificant. The improvement for one factor models is
mainly on the cross-section. On average, the random level shifts reduce cross-sectional
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pricing error by around 20%.
One may argue that the cross-sectional performance could be improved simply by
including more factors. By examining the results of two factor models without level
shifts, it seems indeed the case. However, it should be recognized that such improvement
in cross-section is obtained at the price of degraded time series performance. For example,
comparing the performance of A0(1) and A0(2) both with DS market price of risk, we
find that although A0(2) outperforms A0(1) on bond matured in three, six and twelve
months, it under-performs A0(1) in forecasting the price of bond matured in one month.
Similar phenomenons also appear in other models and with other specifications of market
price of risk. Instead, with random level shifts, the improvement in the cross-section is
achieved without degrading the quality of time series forecasts.
Table 7.9 - 7.11 show the results in the cases of two factor models. It turns out that
the improvement could be very substantial. For example, in the case of A2(2) with CFK
market price of risk, the average twenty days absolute forecast error of one month bond
price is 8.11E-05, without level shifts. The error reduces to 3.16E-05 with level shifts,
which implies an error reduction of 61%. Similarly, in the case of A1(2) with DS market
price of risk, the average twenty days absolute forecast error of one month bond price
is 5.07E-05, without level shifts. The error reduces to 2.89E-05 with level shifts, which
translates into an error reduction of 43%. The improvements in cross-section are stable,
and typically ranging from 18% to 25%.
In order to understand the reason why including random level shifts brings only
marginal improvements to one factor models and substantial improvements to two factor
models, we show in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 the time series of errors in two representative
cases. Figure 7.2 shows the five days forecast error of one month bond price, produced
by A0(1) with CFK market price of risk, with/without level shifts, in the left panel,
and the five days forecast error of one month bond price, produced by A2(2) with CFK
market price of risk, with/without level shifts, in the right panel. We note that the
error series produced by A0(1) is not severely biased away from zero. In this case,
there is little room for the improvements by incorporating random level shifts. On the
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Table 7.7: Out-of-Sample Performance: A0(1)
This table shows the out-of-sample performance of the A0(1) model with or without random level
shifts. The results for both [25] and [16] market price of risk specifications are reported. The
quantities reported in the panel of “Time Series” are the average absolute predictive error and
their approximated standard deviation (in the parenthesis), and the quantities reported in the
panel of “Cross-section” are the average absolute cross-sectional pricing error and their approx-
imated standard deviation. The out-of-sample period extends from January 2010 to December
2011 and the models are estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Forecast Length DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Time Series
1M 5d 1.45E-05 1.47E-05 1.60E-05 1.58E-05
(8.18E-07) (8.60E-07) (8.02E-07) (8.48E-07)
10d 2.09E-05 2.14E-05 2.46E-05 2.34E-05
(1.05E-06) (1.13E-06) (1.02E-06) (1.13E-06)
20d 2.82E-05 2.92E-05 3.65E-05 3.41E-05
(1.22E-06) (1.42E-06) (1.24E-06) (1.44E-06)
Cross-section
3M 0d 2.00E-04 1.65E-04 2.00E-04 1.65E-04
(2.49E-06) (2.44E-06) (2.49E-06) (2.44E-06)
6M 0d 8.67E-04 6.91E-04 8.67E-04 6.92E-04
(7.79E-06) (7.80E-06) (7.79E-06) (7.80E-06)
1Y 0d 3.50E-03 2.70E-03 3.50E-03 2.70E-03
(3.31E-05) (3.32E-05) (3.31E-05) (3.32E-05)
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Table 7.8: Out-of-Sample Performance: A1(1)
This table shows the out-of-sample performance of the A1(1) model with or without random level
shifts. The results for both [25] and [16] market price of risk specifications are reported. The
quantities reported in the panel of “Time Series” are the average absolute predictive error and
their approximated standard deviation (in the parenthesis), and the quantities reported in the
panel of “Cross-section” are the average absolute cross-sectional pricing error and their approx-
imated standard deviation. The out-of-sample period extends from January 2010 to December
2011 and the models are estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Forecast Length DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Time Series
1M 5d 1.62E-05 1.53E-05 1.63E-05 1.62E-05
(8.04E-07) (8.47E-07) (8.07E-07) (8.48E-07)
10d 2.52E-05 2.24E-05 2.56E-05 2.48E-05
(1.02E-06) (1.11E-06) (1.02E-06) (1.11E-06)
20d 3.78E-05 3.14E-05 3.88E-05 3.68E-05
(1.25E-06) (1.40E-06) (1.26E-06) (1.45E-06)
Cross-section
3M 0d 2.00E-04 1.65E-04 2.00E-04 1.67E-04
(2.49E-06) (2.44E-06) (2.49E-06) (2.45E-06)
6M 0d 8.66E-04 6.92E-04 8.66E-04 6.99E-04
(7.79E-06) (7.80E-06) (7.79E-06) (7.80E-06)
1Y 0d 3.50E-03 2.70E-03 3.50E-03 2.80E-03
(3.31E-05) (3.32E-05) (3.31E-05) (3.32E-05)
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Table 7.9: Out-of-Sample Performance: A0(2)
This table shows the out-of-sample performance of the A0(2) model with or without random level
shifts. The results for both [25] and [16] market price of risk specifications are reported. The
quantities reported in the panel of “Time Series” are the average absolute predictive error and
their approximated standard deviation (in the parenthesis), and the quantities reported in the
panel of “Cross-section” are the average absolute cross-sectional pricing error and their approx-
imated standard deviation. The out-of-sample period extends from January 2010 to December
2011 and the models are estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Forecast Length DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Time Series
1M 5d 3.40E-05 2.53E-05 2.82E-05 1.98E-05
(7.45E-07) (7.25E-07) (7.09E-07) (6.98E-07)
10d 5.68E-05 4.05E-05 4.25E-05 2.66E-05
(1.11E-06) (9.94E-07) (9.99E-07) (8.67E-07)
20d 8.85E-05 6.08E-05 5.81E-05 2.87E-05
(1.42E-06) (1.32E-06) (1.26E-06) (1.04E-06)
3M 5d 5.41E-05 4.69E-05 4.19E-05 3.64E-05
(1.53E-06) (1.51E-06) (1.46E-06) (1.58E-06)
10d 8.36E-05 7.01E-05 6.09E-05 5.20E-05
(2.25E-06) (2.15E-06) (1.98E-06) (2.25E-06)
20d 1.12E-04 9.28E-05 7.94E-05 7.84E-05
(3.01E-06) (2.83E-06) (2.44E-06) (2.99E-06)
Cross-section
6M 0d 3.58E-04 2.94E-04 3.56E-04 2.91E-04
(4.36E-06) (4.31E-06) (4.37E-06) (4.32E-06)
1Y 0d 2.70E-03 2.20E-03 2.70E-03 2.20E-03
(2.62E-05) (2.60E-05) (2.62E-05) (2.60E-05)
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Table 7.10: Out-of-Sample Performance: A1(2)
This table shows the out-of-sample performance of the A1(2) model with or without random level
shifts. The results for both [25] and [16] market price of risk specifications are reported. The
quantities reported in the panel of “Time Series” are the average absolute predictive error and
their approximated standard deviation (in the parenthesis), and the quantities reported in the
panel of “Cross-section” are the average absolute cross-sectional pricing error and their approx-
imated standard deviation. The out-of-sample period extends from January 2010 to December
2011 and the models are estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Forecast Length DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Time Series
1M 5d 2.45E-05 1.73E-05 2.16E-05 1.72E-05
(7.00E-07) (7.28E-07) (6.68E-07) (7.27E-07)
10d 3.78E-05 2.46E-05 3.00E-05 2.44E-05
(9.40E-07) (8.83E-07) (8.39E-07) (8.82E-07)
20d 5.07E-05 2.89E-05 3.11E-05 2.84E-05
(1.18E-06) (1.03E-06) (9.16E-07) (1.03E-06)
3M 5d 3.88E-05 3.61E-05 3.74E-05 3.61E-05
(1.41E-06) (1.56E-06) (1.44E-06) (1.57E-06)
10d 5.26E-05 5.01E-05 5.09E-05 5.07E-05
(1.87E-06) (2.20E-06) (2.04E-06) (2.22E-06)
20d 5.91E-05 7.31E-05 8.05E-05 7.66E-05
(2.03E-06) (2.99E-06) (2.85E-06) (3.06E-06)
Cross-section
6M 0d 3.48E-04 2.46E-04 3.48E-04 2.65E-04
(4.41E-06) (4.34E-06) (4.41E-06) (4.35E-06)
1Y 0d 2.70E-03 2.00E-03 2.70E-03 2.10E-03
(2.61E-05) (2.60E-05) (2.61E-05) (2.60E-05)
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Table 7.11: Out-of-Sample Performance: A2(2)
This table shows the out-of-sample performance of the A2(2) model with or without random level
shifts. The results for both [25] and [16] market price of risk specifications are reported. The
quantities reported in the panel of “Time Series” are the average absolute predictive error and
their approximated standard deviation (in the parenthesis), and the quantities reported in the
panel of “Cross-section” are the average absolute cross-sectional pricing error and their approx-
imated standard deviation. The out-of-sample period extends from January 2010 to December
2011 and the models are estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Forecast Length DS DS(S) CFK CFK(S)
Time Series
1M 5d 3.09E-05 2.33E-05 3.58E-05 1.94E-05
(7.25E-07) (7.29E-07) (7.56E-07) (7.25E-07)
10d 5.04E-05 3.49E-05 5.75E-05 2.79E-05
(1.07E-06) (9.43E-07) (1.12E-06) (8.89E-07)
20d 7.56E-05 4.22E-05 8.11E-05 3.16E-05
(1.38E-06) (1.13E-06) (1.42E-06) (1.04E-06)
3M 5d 4.84E-05 3.68E-05 5.46E-05 3.64E-05
(1.46E-06) (1.52E-06) (1.52E-06) (1.58E-06)
10d 7.10E-05 5.01E-05 8.00E-05 5.25E-05
(2.07E-06) (2.16E-06) (2.20E-06) (2.28E-06)
20d 8.64E-05 7.83E-05 9.22E-05 9.18E-05
(2.52E-06) (3.09E-06) (2.66E-06) (3.28E-06)
Cross-section
6M 0d 3.55E-04 3.25E-04 3.55E-04 2.57E-04
(4.37E-06) (4.44E-06) (4.37E-06) (4.37E-06)
1Y 0d 2.70E-03 2.50E-03 2.70E-03 2.10E-03
(2.61E-05) (2.62E-05) (2.62E-05) (2.59E-05)
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contrary, the error series produced by A2(2) is systematically biased away from zero. In
this case, incorporating the level shifts tends to reduce the bias substantially, hence the
improvements could be significant.
Figure 7.3 shows the cross-sectional pricing errors of six month bond, produced by
A0(1) with CFK market price of risk, with/without level shifts, in the left panel, and
by A2(2) with CFK market price of risk, with/without level shifts, in the right panel.
It can be observed that typically the cross-sectional pricing errors are biased away from
zero, and incorporating the random level shifts reduces the bias to some extent, hence
resulting in smaller cross-sectional pricing error.
We emphasis again that the improvements are almost uniform in each model. In other
words, the improvement in one aspect is not coming at the cost of sacrificing performance
in another aspect. In addition, the A1(2) model with CFK market price of risk and with
level shifts seems to exhibit the best out-of-sample performance, among all the models we
investigate in this chapter. Besides the good cross-sectional performance, its short-term
forecast of one month bond price is even comparable to the one factor models, which is
a significant improvement to the two factor models.







































Figure 7.2: Time Series Forecast Error
This figure depicts the time series plot of the five days forecast errors of one month bond’s price,
produced by A0(1) and A2(2) with CFK market price of risk, with/without level shifts. The solid
lines are the error series produced by models without level shifts and the dashed lines are the
error series produced by models with level shifts. The forecast exercises are conducted during
the out-of-sample period, which extends from January 2010 to December 2011. The models are
estimated using the data from January 2002 to December 2009. Left panel: A0(1). Right panel:
A2(2).





































Figure 7.3: Cross-Sectional Pricing Error
This figure depicts the time series plot of the cross-sectional pricing errors of six months bond’s
price, produced by A0(1) and A2(2) with CFK market price of risk, with/without level shifts. The
solid lines are the error series produced by models without level shifts and the dashed lines are
the error series produced by models with level shifts. The pricing exercises are conducted during
the out-of-sample period, which extends from January 2010 to December 2011. The models are




In this thesis we investigate two problems in quantitative finance. The first is a portfolio
selection problem faced by an open-end fund manager, and the second is about the
modeling of the U.S. short-term yields.
The study in part I contributes to the intersection of two strands of research, one
on the implications of transaction costs to dynamic asset allocation, the other on risk-
shifting incentives of mutual fund managers induced by a positive and convex response
of investors’ flows to relative past performance.
In this study, we focus on the portfolio and incentive distortions induced by the
liquidity offered by open-end funds to the investing public. We show that money flows
can significantly amplify the magnitude of the effect of transaction costs on liquidity
premia. Given the size of the mutual fund industry, fund managers can be the marginal
investor in certain assets. We believe that studying the investment decisions of open-end
equity funds is relevant and can have important asset pricing implications.
We also show that the transaction costs could reduce the utility costs of portfolio
delegation, for those conservative investors. Typically, individual investors are believed
to be more conservative than the financial professionals. This finding suggests that
transaction costs could be in fact beneficial to the public investors, if they decide to
delegate the management of their wealth to the open-end mutual funds.
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We are aware that this study is limited in several important ways. For ease of expo-
sition, we assume that investors’ flows into and out of open-end funds are given by an
exogenous function. It would be useful in future research to let the investors endoge-
nously decide when to purchase or redeem their fund shares, as well as to let them decide
how much of their savings to hold in a money market account and how much to invest
in the managed portfolio of the mutual fund.1
As for part II, we find that there is considerable evidence regarding the presence of
level shifts in the U.S. short-term yields data. In addition, there are economic reasons
as well to believe that short-term interest rates are subject to level shifts. However,
classic short rate models typically do not incorporate these level shifts. The absence of
this important component in these models crucially limits their empirical pricing and
forecasting performance.
In this study we augment short rate models with random level shifts to capture
the salient level shifting feature of U.S. short-term yields. The empirical study shows
that the affine yield models with random level shifts almost uniformly outperform their
counterparts without level shifts out-of-sample. These empirical tests demonstrate that
level shifts contain important information that could improve our understanding on the
evolution of short-term yields.
This study could also be extended in many directions. In this study we focus our em-
pirical study on the affine yield models. However, we believe that the general framework
could be applied to other non-affine interest rate models as well, e.g., [11], [21]. Another
interesting topic is to investigate the level shifts in other short-term loan markets, such
as the repo market. We leave them for future research.
1 In a recent work by [38], they take the fund flows to be determined endogenously in a game between
the investor and the fund manager.
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AppendixA
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof. First we derive the OIDE that governs the function V¯ (t, T, J). Denote byD(0, t) =
e−
∫ t




∂t dt, pr = 1− λdt+ o(dt)
∂V¯
∂t dt+ V¯ (t+, T, JX)− V¯ (t, T, J), pr = λdt+ o(dt)




−J(t)D(0, t)V¯ dt+D(0, t)∂V¯∂t dt, pr = 1− λdt+ o(dt)
−J(t)D(0, t)V¯ dt+D(0, t)
(
∂V¯
∂t dt+ V¯ (t+, T, JX)− V¯ (t, T, J)
)
, pr = λdt+ o(dt)
Since D(0, t)V¯ (t, T, J(t)) = EQt [D(0, T )] is a martingale, we must have
Et
[






dD(0, t)V¯ (t, T, J(t))
]
= (1− λdt+ o(dt))
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Dividing by dt and sending dt→ 0+, it follows that V¯ (t, T, J) satisfies the OIDE
∂tV¯ − (λ+ J)V¯ + λ
∫
Dx
V¯ (t, T, Jx)fX(x)dx = 0.
The boundary conditions are straightforward to verify. The equation that governs V (τ, J)
is obtained by a change of variable.
A.2 Numerical Solution to (5.3) and The Convergence Re-
sults
We set x = ey, J = ez in (5.3) and denote by v(τ, z) = V (τ, ez), (5.3) is transformed to
−∂τv(τ, z)− (λ+ ez)v(τ, z) + λ
∫
Dy
v(τ, z + y)fY (y)dy = 0,
v(0, z) = 1, limz→−∞ v(τ, z) = 1, limz→∞ v(τ, z) = 0.
(A.1)
where fY (y) is the density function of Y = ln(X). The integral in (A.1) is a correlation
product and could be computed using the fast fourier transform method according to
the correlation product theorem (cf. [28]). We then solve the equation backwardly in



















where vτ+∆τ is the function value at time τ + ∆τ and vτn is the nth iteration of the
function value at time τ . The above discussion leads to the following algorithm
Algorithm 3: numerical procedure to solve (A.1)
S0. Set v0 = 1, where 1 is a vector with unit entries;
S1. Given vτ , set vτ+∆τ0 = v
τ ;
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break when |vτ+∆τn − vτ+∆τn−1 | < 0, where 0 > 0 is a predetermined error tolerance.
End of Algorithm 3.
During the computation no system of linear equations needs to be solved, hence the
computational burden is very light. Regarding the convergence, we have the following
results:
Proposition A.1. For any ∆τ > 0 the iteration (A.3) in Algorithm 3 converges. In
addition, as ∆τ → 0+, ∆z → 0+, the numerical solution converges to the solution to
(A.1).
Proof. For notational simplicity, we denote vn = v
τ+∆τ
n . By (A.3) we have
vn+1 − vn = λ2




(vn − vn−1)fY (y)dy




∆τ + λ+ e
z
< 1
Combining with the fact that
∫
y fY (y)dy = 1, we have
||vn+1 − vn||max ≤ A||vn − vn−1||max
It follows that A.3 defines a contraction mapping with respect to the maximum norm.
Therefore it must converge.
Next we show that the numerical scheme converges to the OIDE. Clearly, the scheme
is consistent. The stability comes from the standard analysis for the Crank-Nicolson
scheme. Therefore the numerical scheme is convergent.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
We first introduce a well known lemma on the distribution of Poisson jump time.
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Proposition A.2. Conditioning on the event that {N(∆t) = 1}, the jump time τ1 is
uniformly distributed on [0,∆t].
Then we proceed to prove proposition 5.2.
Proof. Note that Q(N(∆t) = 0) = 1 − λ∆t + O(∆t2), Q(N(∆t) = 1) = λ∆t + O(∆t2)













(5.4) directly follows by conditioning on X and applying lemma A.2. (5.5) can be derived













The error term comes from the residue of convexity adjustment (It can be easily shown






























where η(X) ∈ [−Jt∆t2 (X − EQ[X]), 0] or [0,−Jt∆t2 (X − EQ[X])], depending on the sign




Taking expectation with respect to X and note that
EQ
∣∣∣∣ 148eη(X)J3t ∆t3(X − EQ[X])3
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 148eJt∆t2 EQ[X]J3t ∆t3EQ|X − EQ[X]|3 = O(∆t3)
due to the assumption that E[X3] <∞. Combining these results gives (5.5).
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. For data set {Jk : k = 1, ..., n} we define an index set D = {i : Ji+1 6= Ji}. Then










By choosing  < mini∈D{|Ji+1 − Ji|} and approximating the Dirac δ-function by δ(x) =
1
















































the optimum is invariant with . By letting → 0+, we get the desired result.
A.5 Essentials of Affine Yield Models: Pricing and Fore-
casting
A.5.1 The Models
Table A.1 shows the non-nested affine yield models with one factor or two factors, ac-
cording to the classification in [25]. We only list the P -measure dynamics of the factors.
Their Q-measure dynamics are directly obtained by subtracting the market price of risk.
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Table A.1: One Factor and Two Factor Affine Yield Models
This table shows the P -measure factor dynamics and parameter restrictions in affine yield models.
In one factor model A0(1) and A1(1), the spot rate is defined as r(t) = δ0 +δ1Y1(t). In two factor
model A0(2), A1(2) and A2(2), the spot rate is defined as r(t) = δ0 + δ1Y1(t) + δ2Y2(t).
Model P -measure dynamics Parameter restriction
A0(1) dY1(t) = b11Y1(t)dt+ dW
P (t) -
A1(1) dY1(t) = (a1 + b11Y1(t))dt+
√
Y1(t)dW
P (t) a1 ≥ 0
A0(2) dY1(t) = b11Y1(t)dt+ dW
P
1 (t) -
dY2(t) = (b21Y1(t) + b22Y2(t))dt+ dW
P
2 (t) -




1 (t) a1 ≥ 0




2 (t) β ≥ 0




1 (t) a1 ≥ 0, b12 ≥ 0




2 (t) a2 ≥ 0, b21 ≥ 0
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Table A.2: Specifications of the Market Price of Risk in the Affine Yield Models
This table presents the specifications of market price of risk proposed in [25] (DS) and in [16]
(CFK). These specifications are applied to both the affine yield models with or without random
level shifts.
DS CFK
λ1(t) λ2(t) λ1(t) λ2(t)


























Table A.2 shows the market price of risk specifications, including the completely affine
market price of risk in [25] and the extended market price of risk in [16].
Table A.1 also shows various parameter restrictions that ensure the existence of the
models. However, with the extended market price of risk, more parameter restrictions
need to be imposed to ensure the models are arbitrage free. The details could be found
in [16].
A.5.2 Transition Densities
Transition density plays a central role in the estimation procedure. For affine yield
models, the transition densities are available in closed form only in some special cases.
Specifically, closed form transition densities are available for all one factor models and
they can be found in many standard textbooks, for example, [13]. For two factor models,
it is only available for A0(2). It is Gaussian and given by
T (Y1(∆) ∈ dy1, Y2(∆) ∈ dy2|Y1(0), Y2(0)) = φ(z1, z2; Σ)dy1dy2
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(i) if b11 6= b22
z1 = y1 − Y1(0)eb11∆,
z2 = y2 − Y2(0)eb22∆ − b21Y1(0)e
b11∆ − eb22∆































(ii) if b11 = b22
z1 = y1 − Y1(0)eb11∆,


























A.5.3 Pricing and Forecasting
Pricing zero coupon bond or forecasting the price of zero coupon bond are similar among
the affine yield models. For one-factor models, they can be evaluated in closed form. For
two-factor model A0(2) they can also be evaluated in closed form. However, for general
A1(2) and A2(2), closed form solutions are not available. Instead, a system of Ricatti
ordinary differential equations must be solved numerically. In the following we use A2(2)
as an illustrative example. The price of a zero coupon bond with time-to-maturity τ in
A.5 Essentials of Affine Yield Models: Pricing and Forecasting 102
A2(2) is given by
f(t, y1, y2) = e
−y1C1(τ)−y2C2(τ)−C0(τ)
where τ = T − t and C0, C1, C2 satisfy







C21 (τ) + δ1,







C22 (τ) + δ2,
C ′0(τ) = a
Q
1 C1(τ) + a
Q
2 C2(τ) + δ0
with initial condition C0(0) = C1(0) = C2(0) = 0.










. It can be shown that
φ(t, y1, y2) = e
−y1D1(s)−y2D2(s)−D0(s)



















1 D1(s) + a
P
2 D2(s)
with initial condition Di(0) = Ci(L), i = 0, 1, 2.
